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The Clinton Impeachment and the Constitution: 
Introduction to the Federalist Society Panel 
Thomas R. Lee* 
On February 12, 1999, the United States Senate voted not 
to convict President William Jefferson Clinton of two articles of 
impeachment passed against him in the House of Representa-
tives.1 The first article alleged that President Clinton was 
guilty of perjury before a federal grand jury convened as part of 
the independent counsel’s investigation of the President’s con-
duct.2 The second alleged that President Clinton was guilty of 
obstruction of justice.3 The impeachment proceedings in the 
House and Senate sparked a national dialogue about the Con-
stitution, the use of legalisms,4 and the role of the media and of 
personal investigation of public figures. While the Senate’s vote 
effectively concluded those proceedings, it did not bring closure 
to the national debate about these important issues.5 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law 
School. B.A., 1988, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1991, University of Chicago. Spe-
cial thanks to the Brigham Young University Chapter of the Federalist Society for or-
ganizing and sponsoring the panel discussion that is published below and to Senator 
Robert Bennett, Congressman Chris Cannon, former Senate Legal Counsel Thomas 
Griffith, and Gregory Craig, Esq., for their participation on the panel. Thanks to Mar-
cus Mumford and Melissa Rawlinson for their helpful assistance in preparing the in-
troduction to the transcript of the panel discussion and to Michael Lee and Ryan Nel-
son for their comments on earlier drafts. 
 1. See 145 CONG. REC. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (Article I: 45 guilty, 55 
not guilty); id. at S1459 (Article II: 50 guilty, 50 not guilty). 
 2. See H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 3. See id. Two other articles, alleging perjury in a civil deposition and mislead-
ing statements to Congress, were defeated in the House. See 144 CONG. REC. H12,040-
42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998). 
 4. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Lies and Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605, 
606, 616-17 (1999) (asking whether “legalistic meanings, when used outside of the law-
yer’s professional roles, [are] descriptively different from lies” and concluding that 
“President Clinton’s lies can be viewed as threatening to the system precisely because 
the system relies so heavily on legalistic deceptions”). 
 5. Compare, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted 
Bill Clinton Impeached?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 666, 666 (1999) (“I conclude that if the 
charges . . . are true, then the impeachment and removal of President Clinton is called 
for by the original understanding of those who framed the impeachment provisions of 
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In an attempt to facilitate a further airing of the public de-
bate of the issues presented by the Clinton impeachment pro-
ceedings and Senate trial, the Brigham Young University 
Chapter of the Federalist Society sponsored a discussion by a 
panel of four of the prominent players in the proceedings. The 
panel, convened at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben 
Clark Law School on April 2, 1999, consisted of four individuals 
who performed frontline roles in the Clinton trial: Senator 
Robert Bennett of Utah, who sat in judgment of the President 
during the Senate trial; Congressman Chris Cannon of Utah, 
who prosecuted the President as one of the House Managers in 
the Senate trial; Attorney Gregory Craig, who was retained as 
Special White House Impeachment Counsel shortly before the 
House impeached the President and who headed up the Presi-
dent’s defense team during the Senate trial; and Senate Legal 
Counsel Thomas Griffith, who helped moderate and establish 
the trial procedures used by the Senate in the trial. 
The transcript of the panel discussion follows in its original 
form in Part II below, with only minor editing and revisions. 
The transcript includes discussion of several issues that di-
vided legal scholars throughout the impeachment trial and con-
tinue to do so today, including the following: (1) the proper 
scope of the impeachable offenses set forth in the Constitution; 
(2) whether the standard for impeachable offenses by the 
President should be parallel to the standard for impeachable 
offenses by federal judges; (3) the constitutionality of alterna-
tives to impeachment, such as censure; and (4) the role that 
partisanship should play in the impeachment process. As an 
introduction to the legal issues addressed by the panel, Part I 
offers a brief description of the state of current legal scholar-
ship on these issues with an eye toward providing context for 
evaluating the contribution of the panel discussion. 
 
the Constitution.”) with Laurence H. Tribe, Defining “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: 
Basic Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 725 (1999) (“Applying the principles set 
forth in this statement, therefore, I would be hard pressed to find in anything that has 
been alleged against President Clinton thus far a defensible basis to impeach and re-
move a President from office.”); see also Mark R. Slusar, Comment, The Confusion De-
fined: Questions and Problems of Process in the Aftermath of the Clinton Impeachment, 
49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869, 869 (1999) (“Senators rejoiced in self-congratulation as 
this year-long national embarrassment finally reached its inevitable conclusion. Yet, it 
was particularly unnerving that while nearly every senator and representative called 
these the most important votes of their careers, in debate they were often talking past 
each other, applying very different standards, and speaking of the basic purpose and 
functioning of the impeachment process in markedly different terms.”). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Impeachable Offenses 
Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he 
President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors.”6 Much of the debate surrounding the Clinton im-
peachment centered on the proper scope of the offenses de-
scribed in this provision, particularly on the intent of the 
phrase “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”7 Various inter-
pretive approaches were expressed during the course of the 
Clinton impeachment proceedings. Some constitutional schol-
ars relied primarily on original intent and history as a guide to 
interpreting impeachment clause language,8 while others cited 
pragmatic political concerns9 or relied on the plain language of 
 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 7. See, e.g., Presser, supra note 5, at 675-76 (“Gerald Ford’s famous suggestion 
that ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ means anything the House of Representatives 
wants it to mean, reflects the essential notion that the Constitution confers broad dis-
cretion on the House of Representatives to make up its own mind about what kinds of 
conduct should lead to an impeachment proceeding. . . . [W]hile giving members of 
Congress discretion to determine whether a particular act or series of acts amounts to 
grounds for impeachment, [however, the Constitution] requires them to move forward 
to impeach if they determine there are such acts.”); Gary L. McDowell, “High Crimes 
and Misdemeanors”: Recovering the Intentions of the Founders, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
626, 649 (1999) (“In the end, the determination of whether presidential misconduct 
rises to the level of ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors,’ as used by the Framers, is left to 
the discretion and deliberation of the House of Representatives. No small part of that 
deliberation . . . must address what effect the exercise of this extraordinary constitu-
tional sanction would have on the health of the Republic . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Im-
peachment and Stability, 67 GEO WASH. L. REV. 699, 711 (1999) (“Text, history, and 
longstanding practice suggest that the notion of ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ 
should generally be understood to refer to large-scale abuses that involve the authority 
that comes from occupying a particular public office.”); Tribe, supra note 5, at 725 (“The 
Constitution . . . leaves ample room for judgment, even for wisdom, in the deployment 
of power. What it leaves no room for is the impeachment of a President who has not 
committed ‘Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors’.”). 
 8. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 5 
(1973) (suggesting the use of original intent as a methodology for interpreting the im-
peachment clause). 
 9. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Reflections on Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 693, 695 (1999) (“[The framers believed] that members of both parties [must] 
agree on the necessity of considering the drastic remedy of removal from office. [They] 
were deeply fearful of partisan manipulation of the impeachment process.”); Tribe, su-
pra note 5, at 729 (“To impeach [President Clinton] on the novel basis suggested 
here . . . would lower the bar dramatically, and would trivialize a vital check on execu-
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the Constitution.10 
1. The Impeachment Clause and the Convention debates 
Some of those who looked to the Constitutional Convention 
for guidance suggested that the Convention debates indicated a 
sharply limited notion of impeachment—one that was limited 
to abuses of “public trust” or of the “executive power,” such as 
procuring office by unlawful means or using presidential au-
thority for ends that are treasonous.11 Under this view, the 
language of Article II, Section 4 struck a “compromise” between 
two competing extremes: one that would have permitted im-
peachment for any conduct amounting to “mal-practice, or ne-
glect of duty,”12 and another that would have provided that the 
President “ought not to be impeachable whilst in office.”13 In 
Cass R. Sunstein’s words, the “clear trend of the discussion [at 
the Convention] was toward allowing a narrow impeachment 
power by which the President could be removed only for gross 
abuses of public authority.”14 
This view seemed to garner a great deal of support during 
the Clinton impeachment proceedings. Thirteen constitutional 
law scholars15 asserted in a House Committee hearing that be-
cause President Clinton’s alleged conduct did not violate public 
trust, his actions did not rise to the level of “high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.”16 These scholars acknowledged that perjury 
 
tive abuse.”). 
 10. Daniel H. Pollitt, Sex in the Oval Office and Cover-Up Under Oath: Impeach-
able Offense?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 259, 280 (1998) (“[I]n a larger sense, the allegations 
against Clinton do not fit the language, spirit, or history of our Impeachment Clause.”); 
cf. Tribe, supra note 5, at 715 (“Getting it right means taking seriously exactly what 
the Constitution says on the subject, as well as the context in which the Constitution 
says it.”). 
 11. See Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 285-
89 (1998). 
 12. Id. at 286 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
226 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)). 
 13. Id. (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 64 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966)). 
 14. Id. at 287. 
 15. A total of 20 constitutional scholars were invited to address the question 
whether perjury or obstruction of justice would constitute high crimes or misdemeanors 
for which a president could be impeached. Their testimony is reprinted in Background 
and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of 
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Background 
and History of Impeachment]. 
 16. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7, at 711 (“The current allegations against 
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and obstruction of justice might rise to that level but argued 
that President Clinton’s did not because his actions did not in-
volve the “derelict exercise of executive powers.”17 
Similarly, during the time that the Committee was deliber-
ating over the report of the independent counsel, four hundred 
historians issued a public statement in which they argued that  
President Clinton’s conduct did not rise to the level of an im-
peachable offense because the Constitution contemplates im-
peachment only “for high crimes and misdemeanors in the ex-
ercise of executive power.”18 In the view of these historians, 
President Clinton’s conduct was not impeachable because it in-
volved merely private conduct, not the exercise of executive 
power. The “grave and momentous step” of impeachment, un-
der this view, requires proof of abuse of executive power, lest 
the President be permitted to serve only “during pleasure of the 
Senate.”19 
Others looking at the Constitutional Convention concluded 
that “as finally adopted, the standard of ‘high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors’ seems to have a broader, less restricted meaning 
than merely a narrow interpretation of crimes against the gov-
ernment.”20 In support of this view, Gary McDowell noted that 
an earlier draft of the Impeachment Clause providing for im-
peachment for “high crimes and misdemeanors against the 
United States” was dropped in favor of what would become the 
version that today appears in the Constitution—a version that 
 
President Clinton do not justify a departure from our traditional practices.”); Tribe, 
supra note 5, at 718 (“[H]igh crimes and misdemeanors, as terms of art, must refer to 
major offenses against our very system of government, or serious abuses of the gov-
ernmental power with which a public official has been entrusted . . . , or grave wrongs 
in pursuit of governmental power . . . .”). 
 17. Charles J. Cooper, A Perjurer in the White House?: The Constitutional Case 
for Perjury and Obstruction of Justice as High Crimes and Misdemeanors, 22 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 619, 629 (1999) (quoting Letter from Jed Rubenfeld et al., to Newt 
Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Oct. 2, 1998), available in Back-
ground and History of Impeachment, supra note 15, at 383). 
 18. Historians in Defense of the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at A17 
[hereinafter Historians in Defense]; see also Cooper, supra note 167, at 629-30. 
 19. Historians in Defense of the Constituion, supra note 18, at A17 (quoting 
James Madison). But see McDowell, supra note 7, at 627 n.5 (arguing that Madison’s 
comments “derived from the fact that he thought George Mason’s suggested term ‘mal-
administration’ was too ‘vague’ [and that] Madison ‘never spoke’ to the question of 
whether ‘he sought to limit impeachment to merely abuses in the exercise of executive 
power’ ”). 
 20. McDowell, supra note 7, at 634. 
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omits the italicized qualifying language.21 In McDowell’s view, 
this change in the language of the Impeachment Clause indi-
cated “the general sense of the Convention that impeachment 
was intended to reach political abuses, such as maladministra-
tion or malversation, as well as indictable crimes,” and it also 
“undermine[d] the claim that impeachment is limited only to 
what one might call official duties and does not reach what Jo-
seph Story would later call simply ‘personal misconduct.’ ”22 
John McGinnis reached a similar conclusion. He argued 
that the decision to strike the language permitting impeach-
ment for “ ‘maladministration’ . . . simply shows that the Fram-
ers recognized that performance in office admits of so much 
subjective judgment that it inevitably would allow disagree-
ments over public policy to generate impeachment proceed-
ings.”23 In McGinnis’s view, however, “[t]he decision not to 
permit impeachment on the basis of maladministration is 
wholly consistent with authorizing it on the basis of serious ob-
jective misconduct that bears on the official’s fitness for  
office.”24 
2. Impeachment under English law 
Proponents of the view that “high Crimes and Misdemean-
ors” implied some abuse of executive power also relied on the 
understanding of that phrase in founding-era England. Al-
though warning of the hazard of the inference that the framers 
“meant to transport [English practice] unreformed into their 
new republic,”25 Sunstein asserted that “the term ‘high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors’ ” under English law was generally under-
stood to represent “a category of political crimes against the 
 
 21. See id. at 633. 
 22. Id. at 634 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 764 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 1891)). Cf. Jack N. Rakove, 
Statement on the Background and History of Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 682, 
687 & n.25 (1999) (concluding that the Committee of Style deleted the phrase “against 
the United States” because it “deemed the qualifying words redundant” and asserting 
that the Committee of Style would not “have felt empowered to make a substantive 
change in the meaning of the Impeachment Clause”). 
 23. John O. McGinnis, Impeachment: The Structural Understanding, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 650, 653 (1999). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 290-91 (citing PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. 
HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 266-68 (1984)). 
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state.”26 Put differently, the English practice of impeachment 
leading up to the founding era suggests that impeachable con-
duct included “the kind of misconduct that someone could en-
gage in only by virtue of holding public office,” such as unlawful 
use of public funds, “preventing a political enemy from stand-
ing for election,” or “stopping writs of appeal.”27 
Joseph Isenbergh reached a similar conclusion, asserting 
that “[i]n the 18th Century the word ‘high,’ when attached to 
the word ‘crime’ or ‘misdemeanor,’ describes a crime aiming at 
the state or the sovereign rather than a private person.”28 In 
support of this view, Isenbergh asserted that Coke distin-
guished “high” treason from “petit” treason in that the former 
was “against the sovereign,” and that Blackstone defined other 
“high” offenses as those committed “against the king and gov-
ernment.”29 
Other commentators challenged this narrow depiction of 
English practice. In John McGinnis’s view, “English history 
shows that the phrase ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ was a 
term of art that was not limited to a fixed set of crimes under 
positive law or the common law of general criminal offenses.”30 
Rather, English practice preserved “a wide discretion to indict 
officials for bad acts that made them no longer fit to serve and 
thus a potential danger to the kingdom.”31 
Jack Rakove described the English practice of impeachment 
more specifically. He asserted that “English impeachment was 
essentially a political weapon used by the House of Commons 
in its bitter struggles with the untrustworthy kings, ministers, 
royal advisors, and officials of Stuart England.”32 Rakove cau-
tioned, however, that application of the lessons from this “vio-
lent history . . . we have followed since our own revolution is 
 
 26. Id. at 291 (quoting BERGER, supra note 8, at 61). 
 27. Id. at 292 (citations omitted) (noting that there were “some exceptions” in the 
history). 
 28. Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity From Judicial 
Process, No. 39 OCCASIONAL PAPERS FROM THE L. SCH., UNIV. CHI. 14 (1998); see also 
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lessons of Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 603, 
610 (1999) (arguing that “[i]n the English experience prior to the drafting and ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, . . . impeachable offenses were regarded as ‘political crimes’ ” 
against the state). 
 29. Isenbergh, supra note 28, at 15. 
 30. McGinnis, supra note 23, at 652 (citing BERGER, supra note 8, at 62). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Rakove, supra note 22, at 684. 
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problematic,” given that “the reluctance of the House of Lords 
to convict most of those whom the Commons impeached  
suggests the difficulty of fixing an objective standard of  
impeachment.”33 
3. Impeachment and “plain language” 
Although the text of the Impeachment Clause itself “does 
not answer every question” regarding the nature and extent of 
constitutionally impeachable offenses, proponents of a restric-
tive standard argued that the constitutional language was at 
least “highly suggestive.”34 The “plain language” argument of-
fered by several commentators stemmed from the ejusdem 
generis canon of construction, which dictates that terms in a 
list should be construed to be “of the same kind” as the other 
terms whose company they keep. Because “the terms ‘treason’ 
and ‘bribery’ commonly implicate the misuse of office, and 
would be unmistakable references to misuse of office,” Sunstein 
concluded that “it would be reasonable to think that ‘other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors’ must amount to a kind of egregious 
misuse of public office.”35 Jack Rakove similarly argued that 
“the examples . . . used to describe acts warranting impeach-
ment . . . confirm that they were thinking primarily, indeed ex-
clusively, about failure to perform the duties of office or a mis-
use of its powers, in ways that manifestly endangered the 
general public good.”36 
While accepting the ejusdem generis premise of this argu-
ment, opponents of the restrictive standard of impeachable of-
fenses argued that “the very language of ‘Treason, Bribery and 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ shows that it cannot be 
limited to official conduct.”37 John McGinnis argued that be-
cause “[a]n executive branch official could bribe a judge in or-
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 282-83. 
 35. Id. at 283 (arguing that “[t]he opening references to treason and bribery seem 
to limit the kinds of offenses for which a president may be removed from office”). But 
see Isenbergh, supra note 28, at 10 (asserting that although the Constitution “enumer-
ates several impeachable offenses, nothing in Article II, section 4 indicates that it is an 
exhaustive listing”). 
 36. Rakove, supra note 22, at 687; see also Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 693 (“Ac-
cording to the legal rule of construction ejusdem generis, the other high crimes and 
misdemeanors must be on the same level and of the same quality as treason and brib-
ery.”). 
 37. McGinnis, supra note 23, at 653. 
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der to receive favorable treatment in a civil case litigated in his 
private capacity,” and since treason “does not depend on abuse 
of official power,” the distinction between public and private 
conduct is not supported by the language of the Constitution.38 
Stephen Presser added that both treason and bribery involve “a 
betrayal of virtue and a refusal to exercise disinterested judg-
ment in the interests of the people in order to serve the inter-
ests of someone else.”39 Thus, in Presser’s view, the impeach-
ment standard should not be limited to abuses of executive 
power or to offenses against the state, but should be extended 
by analogy from treason and bribery to any “acts that raise 
grave doubts about his honesty, his virtue, or his honor.”40 
4. Impeachment and policy 
Despite (or perhaps in light of) the countervailing argu-
ments set forth above, commentators on both sides of the issue 
recognized that the evidence of the original and textual under-
standing of high crimes and misdemeanors could not “fix with 
certainty the complete enumeration of impeachable offenses.”41 
To some, the ambiguity in the applicable standard sustained 
Gerald Ford’s (in)famous capitulation that “an impeachable of-
fense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives 
considers it to be at a given moment in history.”42 In the words 
of some, “[t]he Constitution does not dictate what each senator 
must have in mind when voting on removal; it mandates only 
that at least two-thirds of the members present must vote . . . 
to convict in order for a removal to occur.”43 Most, however, 
were unwilling to suspend further analysis in favor of unfet-
tered political discretion. 
Thus, while fixing a universal, objective definition may be 
an impossible task, many scholars asserted that it seems even 
more ludicrous to suggest that the phrase “high Crimes and 
 
 38. Id. at 653-54. 
 39. Presser, supra note 5, at 670. 
 40. Id. at 669. 
 41. Id. at 674; see also Rakove, supra note 22, at 687 (observing that “ ‘Other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ will always defy precise definition, but it is still less 
ambiguous or subjective than ‘malpractice’ or ‘maladministration’ ”). 
 42. 116 CONG. REC. H3113-14 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1970) (statement of Rep. Gerald 
R. Ford). 
 43. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 44 (1996). 
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Misdemeanors” means nothing.44 Indeed, Stephen Presser ar-
gued that the oath that each member of Congress takes to up-
hold the Constitution requires a determination of the proper 
interpretation of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” “because the 
maintenance of the quality of the executive that the constitu-
tional structure demands is part of his or her job.”45 
In addition to their discussion of the textual and historical 
arguments noted above, commentators on the propriety of im-
peaching President Clinton established competing positions on 
questions of policy. One refrain repeatedly offered by the Presi-
dent’s defenders was the notion that impeachment ought to be 
avoided since it would overturn the will of the people expressed 
in the 1996 election. Others expressed the concern that convic-
tion of the President “would threaten to convert impeachment 
into a legislative weapon to be used on any occasion in which a 
future president is involved, or said to be involved, in unlawful 
or scandalous conduct.”46 
At a minimum, some commentators argued that these and 
other policy concerns ought to be balanced against the counter-
vailing harms produced by the President’s alleged perjury and 
obstruction of justice. “Whatever insult the President’s conduct 
may have delivered to the legal system,” Jack Rakove argued, 
“must be weighed against the palpable stretching of the 
boundaries of impeachable offenses that this inquiry risks en-
tailing,” and also against the “concern that leading Framers of 
the Constitution voiced about the danger of subordinating the 
executive to legislative control and manipulation.”47 
Countervailing policy considerations were offered in sup-
port of impeachment. Some argued that “the evident purpose 
and structure of the impeachment clauses” was to “assure[] 
 
 44. Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeach-
ment Debate, 85 VA. L. REV. 631, 657-58 (1999) (“Making the constitutional standard 
for impeachment more definite probably would render the outcome of any future im-
peachment proceedings less partisan. If the Constitution provided that Presidents shall 
be impeached and removed from office for committing particular specified offenses (in 
addition to treason and bribery, which already are enumerated), the clarity of the rule 
probably would constrain partisan disagreements. Yet it seems doubtful whether such 
a gain in clarity would be worth the costs. Some Presidents (and judges) who commit-
ted the specified offenses might be better left in office, and others who committed non-
specified offenses possibly should be removed. Standards generally are preferable to 
rules for achieving outcomes sensitive to diverse factual contexts.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 45. Presser, supra note 5, at 676. 
 46. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 699 (1999). 
 47. Rakove, supra note 22, at 691. 
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that officials seriously unfit for office could be removed but did 
not make them unduly subservient to the legislature.”48 From 
this purpose, John McGinnis argued that “ ‘high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors’ should be understood in modern lay language 
as something like ‘objective misconduct that seriously under-
mines the official’s fitness for office where fitness is measured 
by the risks, both practical and symbolic, that the officer poses 
to the republic.’ ”49 
Other commentators refuted some of the pragmatic argu-
ments offered in support of censure: that impeachment was “a 
distraction from the real business of government”50 or a drastic 
attempt to “overturn the results of the last presidential elec-
tion.”51 On the first point, John McGinnis argued that the 
widely held view that impeachment proceedings are a distrac-
tion from the real business of government, such as maintain-
ing a good economy or passing beneficial legislation . . . can-
not be squared with the Framers’ paramount concern for the 
integrity of public officials. They recognized that the prosper-
ity and stability of the Nation ultimately rests on the people’s 
trust in their rulers. They designed the threat of removal 
from office to restrain the inevitable tendency of rulers to 
abuse that trust. But this constitutional restraint can work 
only if citizens and legislators alike have the self-restraint to 
allow its processes to unfold solemnly, deliberately, and with-
out concern for their own short-term gains and losses.52 
As to the second, Michael Paulsen noted that “presidential im-
peachment almost always will ‘overturn’ the results of the last 
presidential election.”53 
B. Judges and Presidents: Is There a Different Standard? 
The historic vote of the House of Representatives on De-
cember 19, 1998, ensured President Clinton an infamous place 
 
 48. McGinnis, supra note 23, at 652. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 665. 
 51. Michael Stokes Paulsen, I’m Even Smarter than Bruce Ackerman: Why the 
President Can Veto His Own Impeachment, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 1, 5 (1999) (de-
scribing how Bruce Ackerman’s contributions to the impeachment discourse and consti-
tutional theory would provide a basis for the claim that presidential impeachment 
must not be permitted to “overturn the results of the last presidential election”). 
 52. McGinnis, supra note 23, at 665. 
 53. Paulsen, supra note 51, at 5. 
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in history as one of only two presidents ever impeached. Be-
cause the majority of impeachments in American history in-
volved federal judges and other nonpresidential figures, several 
scholars turned to the precedent of those impeachments for 
guidance in the impeachment of President Clinton.54 Attorney 
Charles Cooper, for example, explained that in the 1980s Con-
gress “impeached and removed from office [three] federal 
judges on the basis of conduct that, in all relevant respects, was 
indistinguishable from that alleged against the President.”55 
He found it significant that in all three of those impeachment 
proceedings, “none of [the judges] argued that perjury or mak-
ing false statements were not impeachable offenses.”56 Another 
scholar reported that in every instance of judicial impeachment 
“Congress always has followed a broad definition of impeach-
ment that includes non-criminal conduct and not simply abuse 
of judicial authority.”57 
If deemed relevant, the federal judge precedent clearly 
seemed to mandate President Clinton’s removal from office.58 
President Clinton’s defenders were forced to distinguish presi-
dential impeachment from precedents involving impeachment 
of federal judges. Some scholars argued that “[t]he Constitu-
tion’s structure—life tenure for judges, four year terms for 
presidents—[weighs] in favor of a narrower impeachment 
power for the President,” making “the standard for impeaching 
the President . . . much higher, and properly so.”59 In his pres-
entation to the Senate, Charles Ruff asserted that the test ap-
plied by the Senate for removal has always been “different de-
pending on the office the accused holds” and that the good 
 
 54. See Cooper, supra note 167, at 632-40; Jonathan Turley, The Executive Func-
tion Theory, the Hamilton Affair, and Other Constitutional Mythologies, 77 N.C. L. 
REV. 1791, 1819-44 (1999) (reviewing 15 judicial impeachment cases and several cases 
that were terminated before a ruling on impeachment to conclude that “Congress has 
always followed a broad definition of impeachment that includes non-criminal conduct 
and not simply abuse of judicial authority”). But see Pollitt, supra note 10, at 277 
(“These cases indicate that the Senate, when dealing with judges, has restricted the 
impeachment power close to the core of constitutional language . . . . Scandalous con-
duct in office does not trigger an impeachment.”). 
 55. Cooper, supra note 167, at 632. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Turley, supra note 54, at 1844. 
 58. In the most recent example of a federal judge impeachment, Judge Walter 
Nixon, Jr., was impeached and removed for making false statements before the grand 
jury and for bringing disrepute to the federal judiciary. See id. at 1837. 
 59. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 708. 
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behavior clause applicable to federal judges created a different 
standard for judges.60 That clause, found in Article III, Section 
1, provides that judges “shall hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour.”61 While there is some disagreement as to whether 
the good behavior clause actually creates an alternative basis 
for removal, Clinton supporters argued that “our history has 
converged on the judgment that there is a lower threshold for 
judges than for presidents.”62 
C. The Censure Alternative 
Over the course of the thirteen-month impeachment ordeal, 
members of both the House and Senate debated the propriety 
of a censure resolution to punish President Clinton for his con-
duct. A number of members believed that censure was an effec-
tive and viable alternative to impeachment. Although they 
were loath to convict the President, they did not “want the vote 
to acquit viewed as a vote to exonerate.”63 Many saw it as Sena-
tor John D. Rockefeller did—an effective way “to say to myself 
and my people, ‘What he did was wrong.’ ”64 
Other members opposed censure on the ground that consti-
tutional provisions governing impeachment provide for convic-
tion and removal as the sole remedy for presidential miscon-
duct65 and because they feared it would set a weak precedent 
for dealing with the delinquent conduct of future presidents. 
Senator Larry Craig of Idaho explained, “Most of us look at 
[censure] as a raw political cover. . . . It’s nothing more than a 
slap on the wrist . . . .”66 Other senators, like Phil Gramm of 
 
 60. See 145 CONG. REC. S487 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999) (statement of White House 
Counsel Charles Ruff). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 62. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 709; compare id. at 708 (arguing that the good be-
havior provision does not permit that judges may be removed from office for bad behav-
ior) with Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alter-
natives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1989) (arguing that the good behavior and 
impeachment clauses provide that federal judges may serve for life subject to removal 
either for an impeachable offense or for bad behavior). 
 63. David Broder, Don’t Hide Behind Censure, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at A17 
(quoting Senator Susan Collins of Maine and others who supported a censure resolu-
tion in the Senate). 
 64. Id. (quoting Senator John D. Rockefeller). 
 65. See also Robert H. Bork, Read the Constitution: It’s Removal or Nothing, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1999, at A21. 
 66. James Carney & John F. Dickerson, Waiting for the Bell, TIME, Feb. 15, 1999, 
at 30; see also Wendy Koch, Censure Effort Hinges on GOP, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 1999, 
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Texas, expressed the concern that the precedent created by a 
censure resolution could come to be seen as the easy way out of 
any difficult political decision in the future and could eviscerate 
the constitutional structure of separation of powers.67 
Legal scholars also offered competing views as to the consti-
tutionality of impeachment alternatives such as censure. On 
one hand, some commentators noted that impeachment was 
the sole sanction prescribed by the Constitution. Article II pro-
vides that the president “shall be removed from Office” upon 
impeachment and conviction.68 Article I states that “[j]udgment 
in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to re-
moval from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any 
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.”69 
Without more, some scholars concluded that the Constitution 
should be read to “contemplate[] a single procedure for Con-
gress to deal with the derelictions of a civil officer” and to rule 
out all others.70 Others went even further, arguing that “cen-
sure would constitute an unconstitutional bill of attainder, vio-
late the separation of powers, be used to harass presidents, or 
circumvent the impeachment process by permitting a condem-
nation by simple majority where a supermajority does not exist 
to remove.”71 
Other scholars could not find a constitutional prohibition 
against censure and argued, in fact, that “every conceivable 
source of constitutional authority—text, structure, original un-
derstanding, and historical practices—supports the legitimacy 
of the House’s and/or the Senate’s passage of a resolution ex-
pressing disapproval of the President’s conduct.”72 Joseph Isen-
bergh, for example, attempted to demonstrate that the lan-
guage of the Constitution could be read to allow for judgments 
 
at 15A (citing Senator Phil Gramm’s concerns over the censure proposals). 
 67. See Broder, supra note 63, at A17; Edward Walsh, Senate Puts Censure Reso-
lution on Hold—Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1999, at A32 (“Gramm said the 
resolution would set a ‘very dangerous precedent’ that could easily ‘corrode the [doc-
trine of] separation of powers, which is the foundation of the American political sys-
tem.’ ‘The motivation for it is clear,’ Gramm added. ‘People want it both ways. They 
want to find the president guilty and not guilty at the same time.’ ”). 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 70. McGinnis, supra note 23, at 662. 
 71. Randall K. Miller, Presidential Sanctuaries after the Clinton Sex Scandals, 22 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 647, 725 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
 72. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of Censure, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 
33, 34 (1999). 
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less than impeachment.73 He argued that by providing an up-
per limit in the Constitution to what Congress could do in cases 
of impeachment—that “Judgment in Cases of Impeachment 
shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and dis-
qualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or 
Profit under the United States”74—but not a downward limit, 
the framers intended to allow for judgments that extend far 
less than actual removal and disqualification, namely cen-
sure.75 
D. The Role of Partisanship in the Impeachment Process 
The political implications of impeachment in America’s two-
party system prompted many to question the proper role of 
partisanship in the impeachment and trial of President Clin-
ton. Critics of the Clinton impeachment berated Republicans 
for proceeding with an impeachment that lacked bipartisan 
support.76 The President’s supporters, for their part, called at-
tention to the framers’ fear of “partisan manipulation of the 
impeachment process” in their review of impeachment his-
tory.77 They pointed out that Alexander Hamilton had cau-
tioned against the “great[] danger that the decision [of im-
peachment] will be regulated more by the comparative strength 
of the parties than by the real demonstrations of innocence or 
 
 73. See Isenbergh, supra note 28, at 9, 12. 
 74. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3. 
 75. See Isenbergh, supra note 28, at 12; see also Gerhardt, supra note 72, at 34 
(“[T]here are several textual provisions of the Constitution confirming the House’s or 
the Senate’s authority to memorialize its opinions on public matters. The Constitution 
authorizes the House of Representatives and the Senate each to ‘keep a Journal of its 
Proceedings,’ and provides that ‘for any Speech or Debate in either House, [members] 
shall not be questioned in any other Place.’ Moreover, the First Amendment presuma-
bly protects, individually or collectively, members’ expressions of opinion about an offi-
cial’s misconduct. One may plainly infer from these various textual provisions the au-
thority of the House, the Senate, or both to pass a non-binding resolution expressing an 
opinion—pro or con—on some public matter, such as that a president’s conduct has 
been reprehensible or worthy of condemnation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 76. See, e.g., Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 696 (“The current impeachment pro-
ceedings, judging by the strictly partisan vote in the House of Representatives, fails the 
legitimacy test [the framers established in their discussions of impeachment].” (foot-
note omitted)); Edward J. Larson, Of Course It’s Partisan, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1998, 
at A14 (“From President Clinton’s defenders we hear that the impeachment process 
has become too partisan, that impeachment should be above politics. As a historian, I 
can’t see what all the fuss is about. Of course impeachment is partisan.”). 
 77. Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 695. 
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guilt.”78 
Many other scholars, however, noted that in making such 
statements Hamilton and the other framers were merely rec-
ognizing the realities of impeachment. They argued that parti-
sanship is unavoidable in a political proceeding like impeach-
ment.79 After all, although Hamilton acknowledged that 
impeachment might become so partisan as to “enlist all [the] 
animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or 
on the other,” the framers ultimately concluded that such a 
proceeding was still preferable to leaving a tyrant in office.80 To 
temper the realities of the process, the framers divided im-
peachment responsibilities in the Constitution between the 
House and Senate.81 Randall Miller noted that in their division 
“the Framers required a supermajority for conviction and re-
moval in the Senate—an institution that was thought to be fur-
ther removed from partisan influence than was the House” and 
thus “guard[ed] against the potential that the impeachment 
and removal process would be overwhelmed by partisanship.”82 
Constitutional safeguards were put in place to manage parti-
sanship, not to prevent it. 
Notwithstanding the safeguards, many were surprised by 
the amount of partisanship that persisted in the impeachment 
of President Clinton. Widespread reports on the results of pub-
lic opinion polls seemed to contribute to the partisanship of the 
Clinton impeachment. In an August 1998 poll conducted by 
CBS and the New York Times, 65% of surveyed individuals ap-
proved of the President’s job performance.83 In late September, 
a similar survey showed that only 30% of those surveyed be-
 
 78. See id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 79. See Klarman, supra note 44, at 658 (“Setting aside cases where the Presi-
dent’s conduct is either so egregious or so trivial that both sides will agree on the pro-
priety of removal, intermediate cases likely will result in partisan splits.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 80. Pollitt, supra note 10, at 266 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
 81. See U.S. CONST. art I, §§ 2-3 (giving the House of Representatives the “sole 
Power of Impeachment” and the Senate the “sole Power to try all Impeachments”). 
 82. Miller, supra note 71, at 701; see also Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Be-
tween Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193, 2225-27 
(1998) (pointing out that by giving senators six-year terms as opposed to two years the 
framers intended the Senate to be a more deliberative body less susceptible to partisan 
political winds). 
 83. See Adam Nagourney & Michael R. Kagay, High Marks Given to the Presi-
dent But Not the Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at A2. 
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lieved that Congress should proceed with the impeachment 
hearings.84 Over half said that they would be satisfied if no ac-
tion were taken at all.85 Throughout the process, the Presi-
dent’s approval rating remained high; during the Senate trial 
almost two out of every three Americans approved of President 
Clinton’s job performance and did not want to see him removed 
from office.86 These poll results seemed to encourage the Presi-
dent’s defenders.87 The constant barrage of positive poll num-
bers probably served to entrench both sides of the debate and 
create an “intermediate case[]” of impeachment, one in which 
partisan splits were more likely.88 
Several senators cited the high poll numbers to explain 
their votes to acquit President Clinton. Senator Byrd, in par-
ticular, stated, “In the end, the people’s perception of this en-
tire matter as being driven by political agendas all around, and 
the resulting lack of support for the President’s removal, tip 
the scales for allowing this President to serve out the remain-
ing 22 months of his term, as he was elected to do.”89 Some le-
gal scholars also used the President’s popularity and the re-
sults of the November 1998 election to buttress their criticisms 
 
 84. See, e.g, Bob von Sternberg, Minnesotans Give the Man and the Job Very Dif-
ferent Ratings, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept. 22, 1998, at 10A (reporting that 
in a poll of Minnesota residents “[o]nly 30 percent want Congress to initiate impeach-
ment proceedings, while 58 percent want Congress to drop the whole matter”). 
 85. See id. 
 86. See Jackie Calmes, Issues Beyond Impeachment Vex GOP About Clinton, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1999, at A12 (“[Sixty-eight percent of Americans polled] approved 
of the job that Mr. Clinton is doing.”); Bob Davis & Glenn R. Simpson, Senate Watchers 
Say the Odds Favor Clinton, but a Turn of Events May Mean All Bets Are Off, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 8, 1999, at A20 (“Democrats are sticking with the president, in part, because of 
Mr. Clinton’s astonishingly high approval ratings from the public. Roughly, two out of 
three Americans say they don’t want him removed from office.”). 
 87. See David S. Broder, Should Such a President Remain?, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 
1998, at A31 (“If you want to know why the holiday season is shadowed by controversy 
over impeachment, look back to last Jan. 30, nine days after the Monica Lewinsky 
story broke. On that date, my Washington Post colleague John F. Harris reported that 
President Clinton and his advisers were encouraged by polls showing ‘the public’s ini-
tial shock . . . has subsided sufficiently that they could pursue a policy of withholding 
information about Clinton’s relationship with the former White House intern indefi-
nitely.’ They adopted what one adviser called a ‘ “hunker-down strategy” in which Clin-
ton explains nothing publicly as long as he is under legal investigation for obstruction 
of justice.’ ”). 
 88. Klarman, supra note 44, at 658. 
 89. 145 CONG. REC. S1636 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Senator Robert 
Byrd). 
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of those who pushed for Clinton’s impeachment.90 
A few participants questioned the relevance of popularity 
and prosperity in an impeachment trial. In response to some of 
the scholars’ arguments, Professor John McGinnis noted that 
“the Framers recognized that officials who should be im-
peached and convicted may not only remain popular in the face 
of serious charges, but even after conviction.”91 Senator Pete 
Domenici responded to Senator Byrd’s comments during Sen-
ate deliberations frankly: “Popularity is not a defense in an im-
peachment trial.”92 Senator Gordon Smith of Oregon similarly 
stated, “I cannot will to my children and grandchildren the 
proposition that a president stands above the law and can sys-
tematically obstruct justice simply because both his polls and 
the Dow Jones index are high.”93 
E. Conclusion 
In the end, the Senate’s decision not to convict President 
Clinton tells us very little about the legal standards applied by 
individual senators and even less about the standards adopted 
by the collective body as a whole. The record contains their 
statements and deliberations, and in some instances (including 
those noted above) those deliberations offered a window into 
their individual views on the important legal questions ad-
dressed above. We can probably presume that they found the 
arguments of the President’s defense team slightly more per-
suasive than those of the House Managers, but every senator 
probably processed and weighed the issues differently. The 
task falls upon legal scholars to find some constitutional order 
in the aftermath of President Clinton’s impeachment trial. The 
panel discussion transcript set forth below is offered with that 
in mind and with the hope that it will shed some light and in-
 
 90. See, e.g., Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 696 (“The results of last Tuesday’s mid-
term election show that the impeachment drive has failed in its quest for popular sup-
port and legitimacy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 91. McGinnis, supra note 23, at 660 (responding to the claim that “the continuing 
popularity of a President should insulate him from impeachment”); see also id. at 662 
(“The underlying claim that the President should be insulated from impeachment by 
popular sovereignty is based not only on a historical misconception but also on mis-
taken premises about the way politics works.”). 
 92. 145 CONG. REC. S1502 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Senator Pete 
Domenici). 
 93. Edwin Chen et al., Senate Jurors Begin Private Debate on Clinton Verdict, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A1 (reviewing the statement of Senator Smith). 
LEE-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:30 AM 
1079] IMPEACHMENT PANEL TRANSCRIPT 1097 
sight on the important and meaningful legal questions that 
linger after the conclusion of the Senate’s impeachment trial. 
II. IMPEACHMENT PANEL TRANSCRIPT 
A. Opening Statements 
 
Congressman Chris Cannon:  
 
 It’s a great pleasure to be back here in these hallowed halls, 
where I spent a large part of my life. I’m reluctant to say youth, 
I guess, at this point, but it was a long time ago. I want to 
thank [BYU Law School] Dean Hansen, who’s been a good 
friend for a very long time, for having this happen. I think it 
will be a very interesting event today and thank you, Tom 
[Lee], for overseeing the process. 
Tom Griffith—who is very important in the U.S. Senate. 
For BYU, he’s a treasure. This is really a remarkable event. 
When I got the proposed schedule, I saw Gregory Craig on it. I 
thought, “There can’t be two!” That is, two who were associated 
with the impeachment of the President. Tom [Griffith] was able 
to invite Greg to meet with us today. We are honored to have 
Greg here with us. Let me just say, by way of introduction, that 
I think Mr. Craig had the hardest task a lawyer could have in 
life. Those of you who are going to be lawyers need to be think-
ing about this. You can imagine, this is not defending a person 
from the elements of crime, although that is relevant to what’s 
going on. This is defending a person in a totally political con-
text. You can talk about elements and particulars; you have to 
do so with a straight face. Let me say that all of the White 
House Counsel, I think particularly Mr. Craig, did that ex-
traordinarily well. He did that by not coming in and denying 
the facts that America had concluded on, but by acknowledging 
wrongdoing and then walking us through, at some length, the 
technicalities of the crime. I think that both in the House and 
in the Senate, he did an absolutely remarkable job of doing 
that. 
We’ve all, as Americans, come through a very traumatic ex-
perience. I’ve just gone through a series of Town Hall meetings, 
mostly to the east of Park City and Oakley and out in the Uinta 
Basin. And in Park City, as you might guess, the crowd tended 
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to be Democratic. In fact, there was one fellow there who ac-
knowledged he had been a Republican but had torn up his card. 
The rest didn’t say much, but they were clearly Democrats. Ac-
tually, it was the most pleasant of all the meetings we had. We 
had a very interesting discussion. We then went out to the Ba-
sin, and probably the least pleasant of all the town meetings 
was last night, where there were a bunch of people upset at the 
leadership of the Republican Party. They expressed it with 
great intensity. During all these town meetings there were a 
number of questions, like, “Why don’t we have someone who 
stands up, who is the leader of the party and who will express 
with clarity the principles we are standing for and what we’re 
doing as a party?” The answer to that has to be that this is 
America, and in America we have a president. The president is 
a strong office. We want the president to be the person who 
leads the country. When your party does not have the White 
House, then you don’t have a leader of the party. I’ve also said, 
and I say to you all, if you’re unhappy with the way people are 
articulating the issues of the day, you ought to get out and ar-
ticulate them yourselves. When you consider 435 congressmen, 
535 if you include the Senate, that’s a lot of dilution. The fact 
that you’re not a congressman or a senator probably doesn’t 
make a difference in the kind of press any kind of individual 
gets other than the president. 
We’ve now come through this really traumatic process, and 
let me talk for a moment what that meant in the lives of the 
manager and then talk about what I think happened in the 
Senate, or didn’t happen in the Senate, and what I think that 
means for America today. 
Personally, Congress is not a bad place to work because you 
get a lot of time off—four, five, six months a year. After the last 
election in November, you expect to come back for one week 
and then you’re off for November and December and most of 
January, and I was actually looking forward to that. After the 
impeachment hearings in the House, I was deeply reluctant to 
become a manager because of the time commitment, but I felt I 
had something to contribute to the team. I’ll say something just 
as a side bar, it was one of the most incredible experiences of 
my life to be together with a group of people who were so clear 
and so consistent in that there were views and principles that 
bound us together. In any event, what ended up happening was 
that I spent all of November preparing, all of December work-
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ing on hearings and preparing, and all of January and half of 
February. In fact, during the January and February period I 
was home for fifteen-and-a-half hours out of a four-week pe-
riod. It took some toll. I will say that the toll on me was much 
less than it was on some other people, like Jim Rogan, for in-
stance, who won by three-tenths of a percent, or Steve Chabot, 
who won his district by less than three percent and expects a 
very hard election next time. 
In the course of all this, there was some incredible rhetoric, 
and I thought I’d give you some insight into the character of 
one of the managers and then as a backdrop for what he said to 
the Senate—that’s Jim Rogan. My scheduler had wanted to 
meet him, so I invited her around the corner one time to go into 
his office. As we were leaving, she said, “You know, Rogan’s 
mother just called you.” I said, “Great, what did she say?” She 
said, “You’re her favorite manager, except her son.” I’m sure 
she gave that phone call to everybody else, but I walked into 
Rogan’s office and I said, “You know, your mother just called 
me.” His face went ashen, literally. He said, “What did she 
say?” So I repeated this. “Great,” he said, “because she can 
swear like a sailor.” It surprised me a little bit, but turns out 
his background is very similar to Bill Clinton’s background, 
and yet, he chose at some point in his life to choose principle 
over gratification, and that made all the difference. His closing 
line when he spoke to the Senate was . . . “Dreams come and 
dreams go, but principles are forever.” So in the face of the very 
difficult reelection campaign, he chose a difficult choice, and 
that was to push for impeachment. Thank you. 
 
Senator Bob Bennett:  
 
 The most interesting part of this whole experience for me 
and the other senators was the amount of time we spent liter-
ally behind closed doors. The decision of the Senate to conduct 
its deliberations in a jury atmosphere—that is, without the 
press being present—was the most significant of our decisions 
in terms of its impact on what happened. Because for the first 
time in my Senate career, and the first time I can remember 
thinking back over my father’s senate career, all senators were 
present through all the deliberations. Do you have any idea 
how unusual that is? When you give a speech on the Senate 
you consider yourself a great hero if you have half a dozen 
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senators listening to you. Occasionally, when I give a speech, 
one of my colleagues will come up to me and say, “I saw you on 
television and thought you made some good points.” We all pre-
tend that we watch the proceedings on our television in our of-
fices, and, in fact, none of us do. To have us all there and talk-
ing frankly, which you can do when the TV cameras are off, 
was, I think, the most single and significant impact on the 
trial. 
What I’m going to do is take you through some of the things 
that were said in those sessions. I will not identify the sena-
tors, except by general category, but they give, for me, a gen-
eral chronology of where we were. 
The first comment was made by a liberal Northeastern De-
mocrat in the session in the old Senate chamber. He said, “This 
case is toxic. It has destroyed the White House. It has de-
stroyed the independent counsel’s office. It has destroyed the 
House of Representatives, and it is about to destroy us.” 
I think there was a little bit of overkill there, but there’s no 
question that the case has seriously damaged the presidency; 
seriously damaged the Office of Independent Counsel, if not 
made it probable that the statute creating that office will be 
repealed; seriously damaged the image of the House of Repre-
sentatives; and, by his warning, in danger of damaging the 
Senate as well. I think that was a very wise and insightful 
comment by my liberal Democratic colleague. It was a sobering 
backdrop for the way the Senate as a whole approached this. 
One of the things we did, not by any kind of conspiracy or for-
mal agreement, but just individually, senators came to a com-
mon conclusion that we must not only do impartial justice to 
the President, but we must do it in a way that does not do 
damage to American political institutions and the most pre-
cious one to us—the United States Senate. So we were going to 
handle this in a way that reflected well upon the Senate, and 
frankly, I think we did. The great tribute for the fact that that 
happened belongs to Trent Lott, the majority leader of the Sen-
ate, with a very heavy dose of congratulations also going to 
Tom Daschle, the minority leader. The majority leader was the 
man who was in charge, and he handled it in a way that the 
prediction, the prophecy, that came out of this opening state-
ment was not fulfilled. 
Next, I take you to a moderate to conservative Republican 
from the West, a very good lawyer, who said to us, “We must 
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approach this with the understanding that there are four ques-
tions that have to be answered affirmatively before we can vote 
to convict. The first question, is ‘did he do it?’ The second ques-
tion is, ‘was it a crime?’ The third question, ‘if it was a crime, 
was it a high crime?’ The fourth question is, ‘even if it’s a high 
crime, does it justify removal from office’?” He said, “You can 
come to the conclusion that the answer is yes to the first three 
questions and still vote not guilty.” Indeed, this particular Re-
publican did vote not guilty on one of the two charges. He took 
a lot of political heat from back home for his decision, but it 
was a very principled and carefully-arrived-at decision. 
Interestingly enough, and here I will use a name because 
he’s spoken about it publicly, Robert Byrd said essentially the 
same thing. And Robert Byrd came to the same Republican I’ve 
just quoted and said it publicly. “Did the President do it? Yes, 
no question. Was it a crime? Absolutely. Was it a high crime? 
You bet, but I’m not going to vote to remove him.” That was 
Robert Byrd’s publicly-stated opinion. The difference between 
the Republican and the Democrat on whether to vote guilty or 
not guilty was hair-line thin, with Byrd coming down on one 
side and the Republican coming down on the other, at least on 
the obstruction of justice charge. I found it instructive to have 
that kind of ladder constructed and talked about on both sides 
of the aisle. 
The next one I will share with you was a comment by one of 
the most liberal members of the Senate, and I use him because 
he typifies the seriousness with which all senators approach 
this issue. He said, “There have not been two impeachment tri-
als in our history, but three.” He said, “One did not come to a 
decision, that’s the case of Richard Nixon, but we have in fact 
had three impeachment proceedings.” He said, “In my view, the 
first one was totally without merit, with Andrew Johnson. The 
second one was a clear slam-dunk of guilty with respect to 
Richard Nixon. This third one is a close case that goes in either 
direction.” He then openly discussed with us the anguish that 
he was going through as to how he would vote. I found that an 
interesting juxtaposition of where this case would fall on the 
historic spectrum. 
One of the better lawyers in the Senate said to us, “We have 
to recognize that this is not a traditional trial.” He agreed with 
the White House lawyers. He said that if the first article had 
been presented in any court in the land it would have been 
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thrown out, but the House chose to put it in the language of the 
Nixon precedent, and, therefore, it is not to be viewed as some-
thing to be dealt with in a courtroom trial, but rather some-
thing to be dealt with in the context of an impeachment charge. 
Interestingly enough, this particular senator also voted not 
guilty on the first issue and guilty on the second. 
Time has been called so I will let you read my own speech 
as to where I came down on this one. I assure you that every 
senator approached this with tremendous seriousness, and 
none of us went at it with any sense of relish or satisfaction at 
the challenge that we faced. 
 
Tom Griffith:  
 
 I have a wonderful job, and it’s also a very easy job. The 
wonderful job is to be Senate Legal Counsel. The easy part of it 
is, whatever the Senate does is right, and I find the explana-
tions for it. I think you saw in Senator Bennett’s comments a 
reflection of the seriousness with which senators approached 
this. If you’ll indulge me, I’ve actually prepared remarks so 
that I can keep within the seven minutes, and I hope I will. So 
I’m going to read it to you if you don’t mind. I don’t normally 
like doing that, but I had some thoughts I want to share with 
you, so let’s see if it works this way. 
Most of the criticisms I’ve heard directed at the Senate’s 
conduct of the impeachment trial comes from what I believe to 
be a fundamental misperception of what the Senate is sup-
posed to be doing when it exercises its sole power to try on im-
peachments. The primary debate over impeachment during the 
Constitutional Convention was, who should have the power to 
try impeachments. The Virginia and New Jersey Plans each 
provided that a court try impeached officers. Madison strongly 
urges the Convention to give that power to the Supreme Court. 
Hamilton argued for the creation of a special court. In late 
July, the Committee on Detail proposed trial before the Senate 
and the judges of the Federal Judicial Court. Over Madison’s 
strenuous objections, the Convention expressly rejected these 
proposals and determined that no court should try impeach-
ments, only the Senate could do so. Many of the criticisms di-
rected at the Senate, I believe, have failed to take account of 
this fundamental decision in 1787. 
Throughout the trial, critics, commentators, and even 
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members often relied on a judicial model to undergird their ar-
guments for why the Senate should proceed in this manner or 
that. At points I thought I was going to scream if I heard Greta 
Van Susteren and Roger Cossack say one more time, “Gee, this 
isn’t like any trial I’ve ever seen.” The framers rejected an ex-
clusively judicial model for impeachment trials. The values 
that informed judicial proceedings and the processes designed 
to protect those values would not necessarily be those used in 
impeachment trials. Unlike courts, which are forums for con-
tests over life, liberty or property, an impeachment trial is de-
signed to protect our political structure. The framers con-
sciously chose a political forum for the trial of impeached 
officials. James Wilson, a delegate at the Philadelphia Conven-
tion who later served as one of the first justices on the Supreme 
Court, and who his contemporaries regarded as second only to 
Madison in his knowledge of the design of the Constitution, 
wrote that “impeachments are proceedings of a political nature 
confined to political characters to political crimes and misde-
meanors and to political punishments. Impeachment and of-
fenses and offenders impeachable do not come within the 
sphere of ordinary jurisprudence. They are founded on different 
principles, are governed by different maxims, and are directed 
to different objects 
Hamilton knew that placing the sole power to try impeach-
ments in the Senate meant that the forms and processes of the 
courts would not be required in the Senate. In the now-famous 
Federalist No. 65, he wrote, “This can never be tied down by 
such strict rules. Either in the delineation of the offense by the 
prosecutors or in the construction of it by the judges as in 
common cases served to limit the discretion of courts in favor of 
personal security.” 
The Senate has recognized the limited value of the judicial 
model in the impeachment setting. For example, in anticipation 
of the trial of Andrew Johnson, the Senate determined that it 
sat for impeachment trials as the Senate rather than as a 
court. Accordingly, the Senate struck from its rules all refer-
ences to itself as a high court of impeachment. Furthermore, 
the Senate has consistently rejected efforts to make its im-
peachment proceedings more like a court. It has refused to 
adopt rules of evidence. It has rebuffed motions to establish a 
standard of proof, leaving to each member the determination 
what quality of evidence is needed to convict. To be sure, the 
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framers created safeguards to cabin the political motivations 
they feared could overtake an impeachment trial, but it is in-
teresting how few in number those safeguards are. Jurisdiction 
was limited to allegations of treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors against the president, vice presi-
dent, or civil officers. The sole remedies upon conviction are 
removal from office, which is an automatic and unavoidable 
sanction, and disqualification from holding future office, which 
requires a separate majority vote to impose. The only proce-
dures required by the framers in the impeachment trial are 
one, a two-thirds vote to convict; two, the taking of an oath by 
the senators and their presiding officers; and three, the Chief 
Justice [of the Supreme Court] presides over a trial of the 
president. There are significant consequences from the first 
two of these requirements. The requirement of a two-thirds 
vote to convict, which was a departure from the British practice 
which only required a majority vote, virtually guarantees that 
removal from office cannot occur unless there’s near consensus. 
Hamilton warned in Federalist No. 66 about “the danger of 
persecution from the prevalence of a factious spirit.” 
In today’s policy, that means that a partisan impeachment 
is doomed to failure. In hindsight, I think this means as a prac-
tical matter that if removal from office is the goal, the ground-
work must be carefully laid for bipartisan impeachment in the 
House. It seems to me that such groundwork must involve a 
bipartisan investigation of the alleged facts by the House itself, 
and not by an independent counsel. In my view, the oath is the 
most critical safeguard the framers created. It was the oath 
that was to lift these politically accountable senators above fac-
tion and allow them to see clearly to do impartial justice. Be-
yond these few procedures, the framers said nothing about how 
the Senate should structure an impeachment trial. The framers 
did speak of the power to try and that must mean that what-
ever process is chosen, fundamental concepts of due process 
apply for notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
But beyond these safeguards and those values, the framers 
gave the Senate free reign. What is fundamental is that not 
only did the framers reject the proposal that impeachments be 
tried in courts, but that they did not impose on the Senate “sit 
in an impeachment procedures” that were designed to protect 
judicial values. In my view, modern efforts to do so may violate 
that understanding. This insight that the Senate is not a judi-
LEE-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:30 AM 
1079] IMPEACHMENT PANEL TRANSCRIPT 1105 
cial proceeding helps resolve in my mind a number of the is-
sues that arose in the trial of President Clinton. 
Since my time is out, I will just identify the four issues that 
I think it resolves, and we can talk more about them later. 
Senator Harkin made a motion early on in response to a state-
ment made by Manager Barr, where Manager Barr said the 
senators were jurors and if they found certain facts to be the 
case they had to remove him from office. Senator Harkin ob-
jected to that. The Chief Justice, I think, rightly ruled. Sena-
tors are not jurors, they are senators. Some of the things they 
do in impeachment trial is like what a juror does. Some of the 
things they do in an impeachment trial is like what a judge 
does, but they are neither a judge nor the jury—they are sena-
tors. 
A second issue was the proposal for the findings of fact. 
That proposal didn’t get a lot of traction. I don’t think there 
was anything unconstitutional about the Senate voting on find-
ings of fact, but had they done so it certainly would have been a 
departure from the way the Senate has viewed impeachments 
in the past. Findings of fact are created in the judicial world. 
They’re to impose rationality on judges and juries. We’ve never 
thought that the Senate needed to be constrained in that fash-
ion. 
Finally, almost finally, I’m glad that Senator Bennett men-
tioned Senator Byrd’s speech. Senator Byrd has come under at-
tack for his reasoning in saying, “Yes, the facts were proven. 
Yes, it was a high crime, but no, I’m not going to vote to re-
move.” Without passing judgement on the merits of his reason-
ing, I want to let you know that his thinking is well within the 
mainstream of how the Senate has viewed the discretion the 
senators have in impeachment proceedings. 
And finally, the President’s lawyers’ argument that this 
impeachment was flawed because the articles were written in 
the way they were written. That argument borrows from an ar-
gument that works very well in criminal proceedings, but I 
don’t think it works well in Senate impeachment proceedings 
because of the discretion the Senate has historically given to 
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Gregory Craig:  
  
 Let me first congratulate the organizers of this event. I 
think it’s a great contribution of the wisdom that is already out 
there and that we have acquired and hopefully will be passed 
on to future generations. Let me also add that it’s a little 
therapeutic for those of us who have gone through this experi-
ence to be able to talk about it to people who are still interested 
in it. Let me also thank you, Congressman Cannon. I wish we 
had been more persuasive in our ability to move you in your 
votes, but, nonetheless, I’m grateful for your comments, and 
Senator, any time you want a unanimous consent to revise and 
extend your remarks, you have my support. 
Lawyers like to make lists, and so, in preparing for this, 
I’ve made three quick lists. If anybody wants to elaborate more 
on any of the topics on these lists or any of the items on these 
lists, I’d be happy to do that, but I thought what you might be 
interested in is my view of what the key events were—if you 
have to pick five or six events in the House and five or six 
events in the Senate—and what the framers might conclude if 
they had participated or watched this event, coming back from 
235 ago, and what their reactions might have been had they 
looked at this process. 
First, I would say there were five key events in the House 
and decisions made in the House, that if done differently, they 
might have changed the outcome. I first of all say this is Greg 
Craig’s judgment and guesswork based on my own experience. 
I was a latecomer to this process. I sort-of parachuted in on 
September 15, went through the process until the vote on Feb-
ruary 12, and left and returned to the private sector thereaf-
ter—about the best way I think you can do this, because it had 
a beginning and a middle and an end. 
The key events in the House, I think: One was the decision 
by the House Judiciary leadership not to accept or to join to-
gether with the Rick Hauscher/Howard Burman plan for the 
proposed impeachment inquiry, which if the Republican lead-
ership had done so would not have diluted the inquiry any bit 
as far as I can tell, but would have, in fact, created a very pow-
erful bipartisan consensus behind an ongoing impeachment in-
quiry. That’s point one. That decision had ramifications 
throughout the rest of the process. I have to tell you, Griffith 
and I have not pooled our knowledge or our thoughts before we 
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did this, but, in fact, they feed together very well. 
The second issue was the decision to rely exclusively on the 
work of Kenneth Starr as the basis for the findings and the 
recommendations for the Judiciary Committee and not to con-
duct any independent investigating to hold evidentiary hear-
ings to co-witnesses or to gather their own documents, so that 
the Judiciary Committee’s recommendations and the articles 
that were reported were based entirely on the investigatory 
work of Kenneth Starr and the Office of Independent Counsel. 
There are consequences for that. 
The third decision was not to allow the vote in the House 
for or against a resolution of censure. This was the last oppor-
tunity and a real lost opportunity, I think, to have a genuinely 
bipartisan consensus as to what a result should be. This was 
something that the White House could not participate in be-
cause any time the White House started drafting its resolution 
of censure or proposed that kind of result it would have been 
the kiss of death. It had to come from the House of Representa-
tives’ members themselves. It didn’t happen and then the lead-
ership not only precluded it, but prevented the possibility of 
such a vote being taken from the floor. There were conse-
quences for that as well, because I think it would have passed 
and would have ended the whole process there. 
The fourth was during the debate on the floor of the House 
as the articles were being considered, the use of the evidence by 
some of the Floor Managers, some of the members of the Judi-
ciary Committee, that had not been the subject of discussion or 
debate in the hearings, had not been disclosed to White House 
counsel, had not been revealed to the public, but obviously had 
an impact on changing votes in some members of the House of 
Representatives. We don’t know how many, but it was a proce-
dure and a process and an event that many people thought was 
unfair and represented a low blow. 
The fifth, I think, had significance for the Senate trial, and 
that was the House rejection of the second proposed article, 
which alleged that the President had committed perjury in the 
Jones deposition. This liberated the lawyers to launch a much, 
much more fact-intensive defense, because it was much more 
difficult to defend the testimony in the Jones deposition than it 
was in the grand jury. In fact, after the decision that the House 
made after this debate and its deliberations not to send that 
article over to the Senate for its consideration, we ran a much 
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more successful, fact-based defense in front of the Senate. 
In terms of my list in the Senate, I think the Republican de-
cision to reject the Gordon/Lieberman proposal had conse-
quences for us that didn’t play out the way we feared; but it 
was a great moment of concern for us, because, obviously, the 
majority leader had floated or had blessed Senator Gordon’s ef-
fort to arrive at a bipartisan procedural solution to the im-
peachment trial in the Senate that got rejected by the members 
of the Senate Republican conference. That decision to reject it, 
I think, put us in a world of uncertainty, to the point where the 
speech that Senator Bennett referred to in the old Senate 
chamber was made at a moment of great crisis as to what was 
going to happen to the institution and to the impeachment pro-
cess itself. We had no role. We were just the subjects of the ac-
tivity in that debate, but we were very concerned because we 
thought we were going to lose the partisanship that we thought 
would protect us. Low and behold, we did. We had 100 to 0 vote 
coming out of that old Senate chamber session, which reestab-
lished, at least for a while, a bipartisan approach to the im-
peachment proceeding that was in fact a great threat to the fu-
ture of the President because it rehabilitated the entire 
process. It legitimated what had been done in the House, in our 
view. It gave the House Managers four days of uninterrupted 
presentation of the facts and arguments in support of removal 
where we had no chance to respond or rebut those arguments. 
The third serious implication—and I’d be happy to discuss 
this with the Congressman—is that I think the House Manag-
ers systematically overreached in their presentations on both 
the articles. You may have seen my arguments that we were 
discussing trivialities here about which the House of Represen-
tatives never would have voted to impeach or remove a presi-
dent of the United States. The same was true with overreach-
ing in the arguments about obstruction of justice, where I think 
that the heart of the argument was that there was, in fact, ef-
forts to conceal this relationship, then these court proceedings 
proceeded, the efforts didn’t stop, and those efforts then became 
criminalized. So the obstruction of justice argument really de-
pended upon establishing an intent on the part of the President 
to persuade, to coerce Ms. Lewinsky to participate in a process 
of concealing that she’d signed on completely to preceding any 
kind of court proceeding. 
The fourth key event I think in the Senate was Dale Bump-
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ers’s presentation. I don’t know, Senator, if you agree with me, 
but when Dale Bumpers told his joke it was like a release of 
psychic energy. We had gone through an incredibly intense, 
emotional five days, and there had been no jokes, there had 
been no light touch, there had been no effort to put this into 
some kind of human perspective, and when Senator Bumpers 
made his presentation he humanized it in such a fashion. I 
think he also humanized the President and the President’s 
family situation in a way that was very important to at least 
the President’s defense. 
I think the key moment in the Senate was Senator Byrd’s 
announcement that he would sponsor the motion to dismiss, 
because Senator Byrd was the key Senator both for the Repub-
licans as well as for the Democrats throughout the process. 
When he announced at the conclusion of our case and during 
the first day of questioning that he was going to sponsor, for 
whatever reason, Senator, I’m not sure I agree with his reason-
ing throughout, but whatever reason he agreed that he would 
sponsor and speak for and move the motion to dismiss. It 
seemed then, at that point, that the Democrats were going to 
stick together, and the effort to dismiss the President would be 
defeated. 
Finally, the key moment was the fifty-five to forty-five vote 
on witnesses. I think that was the one significant party-line 
vote, prior to the votes on the articles, that sent a message that 
carrying on the trial any longer would be futile and would be a 
waste of time and would disrupt the business of the country. 
I had a list also of three or four surprises that I thought the 
framers would have found in the process, which I’d be happy to 
discuss in the course of the questions and answers; but it does 
seem to me that if the framers had come back, whether it was 
Alexander Hamilton or James Madison or George Mason, they 
would have found the process that we went through to be noth-
ing compared to what they had predicted or thought was going 
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B. Federalist Society Questions and Answers 
Question 
 
Professor Lee:  
 
 Mr. Craig, my first question is for you. As law students and 
lawyers, one of the things that we do for a living is interpret 
text, and one of the principal issues in the impeachment pro-
ceeding was how to interpret Article 2, Section 4 of the Consti-
tution, which provides that the president shall be removed 
from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, brib-
ery or other high crimes and misdemeanors. How do we inter-
pret the provision? You’ve mentioned something about original 
intent and looking at what the framers would think. Talk about 
your interpretive methodology for coming up with a construc-
tion of this provision and talk also, if you would, about the 
precedent that is added by the Clinton impeachment proceed-




Mr. Craig:  
 
 Do I have seven minutes? Let me just say briefly before I 
get into that—and I’ll try to be brief in answering it—it’s not a 
new question. Between the time of the House vote and the time 
the Senate took up this issue, we met with Tom Griffith and his 
team, and I have to tell you it was a sigh of relief among the 
lawyers in the White House that we were in the hands of an 
even-handed, fair-minded, intelligent, well-trained lawyer who 
was going to do justice and make this process fair. I think on 
behalf of the White House team, I want to pay tribute to Tom 
Griffith’s contribution to the process in the Senate and the 
fairness that the process really experiences, as I agree with 
Senator Bennett that the Senate did itself proud, and we were 
in need of that at the time. 
 
Senator Bennett:  
 
 Thank you. I’m not certain I want that praise in front of 
this group! I think I just lost a friend in the audience. 
 
LEE-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:30 AM 
1079] IMPEACHMENT PANEL TRANSCRIPT 1111 
Mr. Craig:  
 
 I know. I thought half way through this that I just killed 
you!  
 To me, this was one of the genuinely most interesting intel-
lectual and historical and legal and constitutional issues  
was taking this set of facts and these allegations about this 
President and his conduct and, assuming that it’s true, which 
you do in a summary judgment motion kind of proceeding or a 
demurrer kind of proceeding, doesn’t rise to the level of an im-
peachable offense. We had historians testify. We had constitu-
tional scholars, and I know that the House Judiciary Commit-
tee was up to here with opinions, expert and nonexpert, legal, 
historical on this issue. But to me it was genuinely interesting 
debate and largely because the consequences to the future were 
great, if in fact, as I view the case, this conduct, as blamewor-
thy and as wrong and as disappointing as it was, became the 
basis for removing a president of the United States. In my 
view, it would have spelled a remarkable lowering of the 
threshold for an impeachment, and make it possible to contem-
plate the use of impeachment as a political tool—a normal  
political tool—and weapon in normal political debate in the  
future, which would have significant consequences for the 
strength of the presidency. 
One of the reasons I took this job and went to work for the 
President in connection with this case is because I did believe 
that the presidency and the strength of the presidency as an 
institution is one of the great things about the history of this 
country. To undermine it and destroy it in any way, shape, or 
form would be disastrous. It would have happened with future 
Presidents from other parties had we not had the outcome. As 
it is, I think the outcome was the right outcome, obviously, and 
I don’t think the damage to the presidency constitutionally had 
occurred that I worry about. There has been other damage that 
I readily acknowledge, particularly in connection with the 
privilege and with the President’s ability to work with his asso-
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Question 
 
Professor Lee:  
 
 What’s the standard? What does it mean? In particular, can 
you focus on what was sometimes focused on by the President’s 
lawyers, which was “This is purely private conduct. This 




Mr. Craig:  
 
 Let me give you a one sentence answer. I agree with Sena-
tor Bumpers’s view on this that the impeachment power was 
intended to address abuses of official power and threats to the 
system of government, assaults on our system of government, 
on our constitutional framework. If you did not have a presi-
dent abusing his powers as president—directing the FBI to do 
this, directing the CIA to do that, or the IRS to do that, or brib-
ing officials, or using his people to bribe officials—then I don’t 
think you have the kind of conduct that was intended to be ad-
dressed by the impeachment power. 
 
Mr. Bennett:  
  
 Let me just respond to that. Interestingly enough, it was 
Senator Bumpers’s speech that ultimately nailed down my de-
cision to vote to convict on obstruction of justice. It demon-
strates you are focusing on the President’s conduct, as the 
White House lawyers did primarily, with respect to Monica 
Lewinsky. I put that aside very quickly and focused on his con-
duct as President and his actions as President. Senator Bump-
ers used a phrase that I used in my speech that struck me very 
vigorously. He said, “The Constitution was written to keep bul-
lies from running over weak people.” I asked myself, “who is 
the bully and who are the weak people?” Of course, the Presi-
dent structured it that he was the victim and that Kenneth 
Starr was the bully. Our constitutional duty was to protect him 
from the bully of the independent counsel. 
As I viewed it, looking at the case in its total context, in the 
way that Tom Griffith has described, as a senator, not as a ju-
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ror—jurors are restricted to judging the evidence presented in 
the court. The founding fathers recognized that the impeach-
ment process is a safety valve whereby the four-year term 
given to a president can be abrogated if in fact you get a presi-
dent who is, in Charles Ruff’s phrase, “threatening the liberties 
of the people.” The President did not misuse the FBI. The 
President did not misuse the CIA. He did not do the kind of 
things Richard Nixon was accused of, but he misused Sidney 
Blumenthal. He misused James Carville. He misused the 
enormous public relations that the modern presidency has to 
deny one of the weak people her day in court, or her right to ac-
curate testimony in a case. The systematic demonizing of Paula 
Jones over her hair and her nose and her choice of attorneys 
that went on relentlessly was, for me, ultimately a major part 
of this case. And the fact that he lied under oath in an effort to 
accomplish this, and he did some of the other things he did, 
and the House Managers talked about—by the way, I agree 
that the House Managers overreached and damaged their case 
with some of the facts they tried to get us to swallow—
nonetheless, the totality of the whole thing, at the end of Dale 
Bumpers’s speech, I said “Dale has framed it very well.” The 
Constitution is to keep bullies from running over weak people, 
and in this case, Bill Clinton, James Carville, and all the other 
people associated with him, using the enormous powers of the 
modern presidency, were the bullies, and in my view, that 
threatens the liberties of the people, and that’s why I voted to 
convict. 
 
Congressman Cannon:  
 
 As is usual my friend and colleague in Congress, Senator 
Bennett, has spoken eloquently to the point of what this is all 
about. Let me add just a couple of things to that. In the first 
place, it was not just Paula Jones who was discredited. It was 
Kathleen Willey. And I think Sidney Blumenthal is likely to go 
to jail over the testimony he gave under a sentence subpoena 
and under question of House Managers, as it related to the in-
tention of the White House and the use of White House re-
sources and machinery to discredit Kathleen Willey. But in ad-
dition, today more poignantly difficult for us as Americans is 
that you had a secretary of state stand on the portico of the 
White House and proclaim the innocence of the President. 
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Then after three threats of bombing Serbia left us no position, I 
think that Senator Hatch with his statements today, that we 
need to send in ground troops. If that becomes necessary, that’s 
something we ought to do because the credibility of America is 
at stake here. It really comes back to how this President has 
used his staff around him and how their role has changed from 
defense of a president doing things that even Mr. Craig has 
said were improper and wrong to an invasion of another coun-
try and war, where credibility is terrifically important. 
Let me just make one other comment. You see this panel is 
really an interesting panel. You just saw between Senator 
Bennett and Mr. Craig a difference in view of facts, and I share 
Senator Bennett’s view of those facts. So we have a polarization 
that way. On the other hand, I think it’s fair to say, Mr. Craig, 
that you won this case. Therefore, he will have the same incen-
tive to deal with what happened between the House and the 
Senate the way that the Senator and the counsel for the Senate 
have in defending the Senate as an institution. There is a very 
different view of what we did and why we did it as a House and 
what ought to have happened in the Senate. 
And, on the other hand, I think it’s very important that we 
move in some fashion that we’re directing. Tom [Lee], so is it 
your intention that we all have an opportunity to respond to 
each of the questions, or are you going to give a question and 
one person will respond, with others responding a little bit? 
 
Professor Lee:  
  
 It’s the latter that I have in mind. 
 
Congressman Cannon:  
 
 I shall try to accommodate you. 
 
Mr. Griffith:  
 
 I’ll be quick. I couldn’t resist. I want to return the favor that 
Mr. Craig paid me by saying those nice things, and then I want 
to disagree with him. So the favor I will return is that I want to 
let you know, and for this community in particular, that in 
every dealing that I had with the President’s lawyers, his pri-
vate counsel, and his official counsel in the White House, I 
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want you to know that these are good, honorable, honest people 
to the extent that I can judge character. I judge them to be good 
people who care deeply about process, because the law is all 
about process. It really was, for me, one of the thrills that I had 
from this procedure—being able to work with people like Greg 
and other folks in the White House counsel office, as well as the 
President’s personal lawyers. 
Okay, I’ve got that out of the way. But, you didn’t answer 
Professor Lee’s question. I think that the most honest answer—
I’m not saying you gave a dishonest answer—I think an honest 
answer is that we cannot define from the text of the Constitu-
tion what “high crimes and misdemeanors” mean. The debate 
went on during the Nixon impeachment. It was continued here 
at a very high level, but I think the fair answer is we don’t 
know what it meant. You could look at the history of the debate 
to the extent that we have it from Madison’s notes from the 
summer of 1787, it isn’t clear. The original proposal was that 
impeachment be for treason and bribery. There was a sense 
that that was too narrow; it didn’t include enough. 
The next proposal was that it be expanded to include mal-
administration. Madison pointed out that if you can remove a 
president from office from maladministration, he’ll serve only 
during the tenure of the pleasure of the Senate. That was too 
broad. So in response to that proposal, George Mason came up 
with the language “other high crimes and misdemeanors,” and 
everyone said, “Oh yeah, that solves it.” Well, it didn’t solve it. 
The next step in the process was a term of art borrowed 
from British Parliamentary procedure, so the game is you go 
back to British Parliamentary procedure and the answer is it’s 
all over the board as to what it means. But we do have, in the 
two hundred years since the Constitution, seven instances 
since the Senate has determined what it thinks “high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors” mean. The Senate has not made the dis-
tinction that Mr. Craig and the President’s lawyers tried to im-
press upon the Senate between private and public conduct. 
What that means, that’s for the Senate to decide—remember, 
it’s an easy job—they get to decide who is right. 
I think it is instructive that in the seven convictions that 
took place in the last two hundred years, that distinction was 
not made. Now, here is a distinction; however, those were 
judges. Does it make a difference when you’re talking about 
removing the president from office? I think it’s a close call. I 
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think it’s interesting to note that the Constitution does not, in 
Article 2, distinguish between judges and presidents in terms 
of high crimes and misdemeanors.  
On the other hand, the Senate has distinguished between 
that. Not clearly, but in all removal of judges, language was 
used that leads you to reserve that perhaps the senators were 
relying on the something other than “high crimes and misde-
meanors” and removal from office. I think the point is, the text 
isn’t clear. The precedent is more helpful to the President’s de-




Professor Lee:  
 
 Senator Bennett, this question is directed specifically to 
you, and then we’ll allow for some rebuttal and further re-
sponse. To the extent there is ambiguity in what the framers 
mean or what Article 2 means about high crimes and misde-
meanors, there was certainly a lot of discussion about the de-
gree to which public polls or the sentiment of the public ought 
to come in to play. Let me read you two quotes. One of them is 
from a man nearly everybody on the panel has mentioned to-
day, so I didn’t want to be left out. It’s Senator Byrd. Here’s 
what he said about polls. “The lack of support for impeaching 
the President tips the scales for allowing this President to 
serve out the remaining twenty-two months of his term.” Here’s 
the other quote. It’s from Senator Gordon Smith. “I refuse to 
say that high political polls and soaring Wall Street indexes 
give license to those in high places to act in low and illegal 




Senator Bennett:  
 
 The removal of a president is a political act of the very 
highest stature, and you do not remove a president unless 
there is broad-spread support for that removal. If you as a 
senator are convinced that this President in Charles Ruff’s 
phrase represents a “threat to the liberties of the people,” you 
have an oath to do duty and vote to remove him, regardless of 
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what the polls say. In Senator Smith’s case, that’s clearly the 
situation. The polls in Oregon were overwhelmingly in support 
of the President. Senator Smith defied those polls and voted to 
remove the President because he became convinced that he did 
indeed represent a threat to the liberties of the people. I will 
not disclose my conversations with Gordon, but he and I talked 
about this quite often. He and I are fairly close. I wavered, as I 
publicly announced, between voting for an acquittal and con-
viction, certainly on the first article. Without disclosing any-
thing about Gordon, we had a sympathetic conversation on 
those issues. So Senator Byrd is right, however, in that even 
though a senator may vote his convictions, you cannot remove a 
president solely on the basis of a political atmosphere in the 
Senate. You have to have for removal an overwhelming public 
support for it. You can create that support by virtue of the trial. 
I think if it had been a different circumstance, and by the 
way, I agree with most of the things that are on the lists that 
Mr. Craig has given us for the events in both the House and 
the Senate, particularly in the Senate, I think he’s got them all 
right, but the thing the House Managers were hoping for was 
that the trial itself would galvanize public opinion and thereby 
change the polls and create the kind of atmosphere that sur-
rounded Richard Nixon when he finally left the presidency. I 
lived through the Nixon experience. I was in Washington at the 
time and was close to many of the people who were involved. I 
remember Richard Nixon’s being just as high as Bill Clinton’s 
approval ratings, and then things started to happen in the 
economy. The oil embargo hit. People began to blame the 
President for that and the change of public opinion was driven 
by Peter Rodino and what happened in the House, and Henry 
Hyde and others were hoping that that would happen at the 
Senate trial, and it didn’t. I think if it had, the outcome would 
have been very different. I know a number of Democrats who, if 
they had felt that the public wanted the President removed, 
would have voted to remove him. I’m not saying they’re being 
craven and driven by the polls. I think they just decided in this 
atmosphere that to remove this President at this time would 
set a terrible constitutional precedent, even though we believe 
in the ladder that I described. He did it. It was a crime, and it 
was a high crime and misdemeanor, but we just decide we’re 
not going to vote to remove him. I think there is substance to 
both positions. 
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Question 
 
Professor Lee:  
 
 Senator, a quick follow-up question: you mentioned that one 
of your colleagues, in listing the four questions, had suggested 
that there was perhaps discretion—even if a senator decided 
that a high crime or misdemeanor had been committed—
discretion not to vote to remove from office. Do you agree with 
that? Do you think that there is discretion? The Constitution 
says “shall be removed from office on impeachment for and 




Senator Bennett:  
 
 Yes, there is discretion in that language. That language 
does not mean the senator can’t make up his or her mind any 
way he pleases. That simply says if the Senate votes, the 
President shall be removed, but that doesn’t dictate how a 
senator should think. I think Tom Griffith put it very well in 
his presentation, that the founding fathers understood com-
pletely what they were doing here. Those who argued—and 
this goes contrary to what some of the House Managers argued 
with us—those who argued, well if you find that he’s guilty of 
this crime, you have to vote to remove him. I disagreed with 
the House Managers. I think a senator has to . . . that’s why 
they gave it to the Senate. That’s why the founding fathers 
said, “We’re not going to put this in a court situation, because 
this is a political decision.” This is a safety valve, as I say, to 
deal with the president who otherwise has a constitutional 
guarantee of four years, but if we get someone who threatens 
the liberties of the people we have to have some kind of safety 
valve. This is a judgement call above all judgment calls. So 
clearly, I think, by giving it to the Senate, the founding fathers 
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Professor Lee:  
 
 Congressman, I have a suspicion you want to respond to 
that. 
 
Congressman Cannon:  
 
 Frankly, we agreed overwhelmingly on these issues. It’s 
really complicated when you’re dealing with polls and politics 
and the will of the people versus duty and oath. I will point out 
without suggesting any ethical problem on the part of Senator 
Bennett, who I think struggled with this thing and with whom 
I have a narrow legal distinction, but I will point out that this 
horrible legal precedent that he has suggested does not mean 
that the House Managers wanted to do a whole [] presidential 
thing. We have a different view as you approach that, and I 
think as you look at what the Senate did, you might note that 
we came out of this whole process from the Republican point of 
view with the benefit of a weakened incumbent and a tainted 
future presidential candidate. A lot of facts play into this thing, 
not just polls and the will of the people, but what we view as 
the best thing . . . . 
 
Senator Bennett:  
 
 You agree, though, that was not anybody’s purpose, to cre-
ate a weakened incumbent. 
 
Congressman Cannon:  
  
 The Senate is a body of 100 people, and it acts as a group 
with lots of different individual variations. In fact, let me just 
go back to one of the things Tom [Griffith] said. He talked 
about the Senate is right. Let me just expand on that. It is 
right because it is the Senate that decides. It’s nonjusticiable. 
You can’t appeal it. It is the way we create finality and closure 
in times of political unrest. 
One of the elements of the polls that you have to deal with 
in America is that you have a huge number of people. Some 
polls show twenty-seven percent, others up to forty-three per-
cent, of the American people who don’t like this President, 
don’t like what he did, whether it was the sex or whether it was 
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the obstruction of justice and perjury and who are deeply dis-
turbed by what happened in America. I thought this issue was 
important enough that my closing argument was to say to the 
Senate, “You have a burden of going forward.” 
Now, if I might put that in perspective, let me talk about 
what I think the constraints are. We’re talking about polls and 
how polls are relevant. There’s no question they’re relevant. I 
agree entirely with Mr. Craig that one of the problems in this 
process is that it was precipitated by a report from the inde-
pendent counsel, which meant we didn’t develop the facts in 
public. Unfortunately, we spewed the facts into the public 
without any protection or preparation, so we started this proc-
ess historically in an awkward position. But if you view the 
process as not a matter of partisanship or bipartisanship, but 
as a way of arriving at closure, then it is the fact that the Sen-
ate’s actions create closure because it’s the end of the act that 
makes what the Senate does so significant. 
There are some limits on what the Senate can do. They’re 
not hard limits, they’re not the bright red line, but among other 
things the Constitution requires an oath. Now the oath is not 
set forth in the Constitution, but that oath is the second clear 
constraint. That is the oath the senators took. It said, among 
other things, that they swore to do justice impartially according 
to the Constitution and the law. Here’s where Senator Bennett, 
who is not a lawyer, and I disagree a little bit. [] We will de-
velop our disagreement over what you have to do based upon 
what the law constrains. Because you’re not dealing with un-
fettered political discretion by a very wise senator, and I will 
even stipulate that all senators are wise . . . 
 
Senator Bennett:  
 
 I won’t. 
 
Congressman Cannon:  
 
 . . . for the purpose of this argument only. The laws that 
senators are swearing to uphold—that is not a tone that we re-
fer to in isolation. It includes the laws of the land, the prece-
dents of the Senate, the rules of the Senate, and our adversar-
ial context in America. Now, for the first time in the history of 
the Senate, the Senate usurped the authority and the right of 
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the Managers from the House to present a case. Every case 
that had been presented before the Senate up until this case 
proceeded along roughly the same lines, and those are the 
same lines that happened if you’re in an administrative pro-
ceeding or in a criminal proceeding or in a civil proceeding. It’s 
an adversarial process. That means you have an opening; you 
present evidence. The other side can have an opening, but it 
can also have rebuttal evidence. Then you have closings and 
you have rebuttal by the moving body. That did not happen in 
this case, and the effect of that not happening was that the 
senators were left unfettered in their discretion because all 
they had was about thirty-four hours of lawyers yammering 
back and forth at each other. 
If you guys will think back for a moment over the course of 
the trial, you’ll recognize that in the forty-five minutes or so of 
videotaped deposition that was shown in the trial, more was 
done to make people say, “Ah-ha, this really was obstruction of 
justice,” than in all thirty-four hours of the talking that went 
back and forth. In fact, you might ask yourself, there was an 
opportunity to present and then there was an opportunity for 
the White House to present, but there was no rebuttal of the 
White House’s position. 
What the House Managers had was the opportunity 
through questions from the Senate to respond, and that was 
done awkwardly. I personally believe that the Senate did some-
thing that was wrong. They went out of their way to create a 
context, not through a change of the rules, which would require 
a two-thirds vote, but through a calendaring process. They pre-
cluded the Managers from presenting the case as the Managers 
saw the case. In fact, I think that is what gives Mr. Craig the 
ability to say today that the Managers made mistakes. Pre-
cluded, there were things that might have been done better 
historically, but it was the Senate’s determination to usurp to 
itself the right to decide how the case would proceed that pre-
cluded the case from being made to the American public. 
That gets us down to what happens when, after you’ve had 
the evidence, how do you deal with that? Well, you have lots 
and lots of latitude. One of the really interesting historical facts 
about Senate trials is that in the first couple of trials they ac-
tually voted to convict on the charges, and then had a separate 
vote on removal. So you could have had a case, which I think 
would have been highly consistent with what Senator Bennett 
LEE-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:30 AM 
1122 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
has said, where you vote “Yes, this is a ‘high crime and misde-
meanor’ ” and then you have a separate vote in which you exer-
cise your discretion and say, “But it is not removable.” So in 
that sense, we’re highly consistent. You can’t do it, I think, the 
way Senator Byrd did it and draw the conclusion that it’s [a] 
high crime and misdemeanor and then have the latitude under 
our system of law and say, “I will not vote for removal.” It has 
to be done in a different fashion. 
 
Mr. Craig:  
  
 I just want to briefly say that, Congressman, we were very 
against it. As one of the lawyers for the President, we were 
very grateful for your willingness to criticize the leadership in 
the Senate while they were deliberating. We thought that was 




 I might just point out that one of the really nice things that 
happened in this whole process is that we haven’t been shoot-
ing at each other; at least as Republican majorities. But on the 
other hand, I’m highly certain that shooting at the leadership 
had no effect on the ultimate vote. 
 
Mr. Griffith:  
 
 The position I hold is a statutory position and it gives me 
responsibilities. One of my responsibilities is that I need to de-
fend, when called into question, the actions of the Senate. Rep-
resentative Cannon used the word “usurping” the managers’ 
authority. The fact is that it’s a proceeding that the Senate di-
rects and there are plenty of examples in the fifteen Senate im-
peachment trials of the Senate going to the House Managers or 
going to the defendant’s lawyers and saying, “No, you’re not go-
ing to get these witnesses.” 
Back in the 1980s one of the respondents asked for forty 
witnesses and the Senate said, “No.” The Senate controls its 
docket. It doesn’t allow the House Managers or the respon-
dent’s counsel to come in and do whatever they want. In that 
way, it’s not unlike any court throughout the nation. Those of 
you who practice in court, you make a proposal to the judge for 
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what witnesses you want, you may get them, you may not get 
them. What was different here from the other trials that came 
over was the narrow margin of the vote that came over from 
the House. In that way, this was completely unprecedented. 
The Senate had never had an impeachment trial before where 
you had such a narrow vote in the House to send the articles 
over. In fact, most of them were unanimous or overwhelming. 
Here it was party line and very narrow. That, I think, puts it in 





Professor Lee:  
 
 I want to ask one other question. One reason why I want to 
ask it is that it’s a multiple choice question, and our law stu-
dents love multiple choice questions. It’s for you Congressman 
Cannon: The impeachment proceedings, it seems to me, have 
renewed a long-standing debate about how do you draw the 
line between legitimate investigation of public officials on the 
one hand and the politics of scandal or personal destruction on 
the other. I’d like you to address how to draw that line. Here’s 
the multiple choice part: To the extent we have crossed it, and 
maybe your answer is that we haven’t, but to the extent we 
have, who’s to blame? Here are my three multiple choice an-
swers: (a) the liberal media, (b) the vast right-wing conserva-
tive conspiracy, (c) the independent counsel statute. I suppose 
we’ve got either (a) or (b), (b) or (c), (a) or (c), or none of the 




Congressman Cannon:  
 
 I personally think that the President created many of these 
problems by his own behavior. He’s not one of the choices here. 
Certainly, George Stephanopoulos would agree with that. The 
short of it is that I think the President made some mistakes. 
Beyond those mistakes, I personally was stunned by the tidal 
wave of media involvement that happened the day of this reve-
lation and that continued virtually for a year. I think that it 
LEE-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:30 AM 
1124 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
distorted the public discourse. I think it offended people, and it 
was a juggernaut that nobody controlled. I don’t think it’s lib-
eral media, I think it’s a story that’s so juicy that it couldn’t be 
passed up. On the other hand, the politics of the short destruc-
tion goes beyond the attack on the President. I will tell you that 
knowing the thirteen [House] Managers, not one of those men 
wanted to hurt the President and used his sexual problems to 
do so. These are all people who are maybe not senators, but 
highly educated and concerned about politics and worried 
about the precedents they were setting. There were some dra-
matic differences. 
The Independent Counsel Law has serious problems. Re-
publicans have historically always opposed it. I suspect at this 
point we’ll be looking at it in the Judiciary Committee. I sus-
pect that I will oppose it. On the other hand, you have to have 
the ability to investigate the president on the part of the House 
of Representatives and the Senate, and that is a hard thing to 
do. We’ve proved that’s a hard thing to do. How we balance 
that in the future is difficult. 
Let me just say one thing: I apologize about the use of the 
word “usurp.” That was purely a political word. On the other 
hand, in our political system we have two houses that have 
equal dignity, and the only serious debate that happened be-
tween the Managers was whether or not we would go forward 
and present a case under the Senate rules or whether we would 
say your rules don’t allow us to present a case and therefore 
we’ll back off. Here we fall into that gray area between the 
Senate as a body and individual senators and what they were 
telling us. I think that as a group we felt beguiled by senators 
who promised us things that the group itself would not per-
form. Therefore, we ended up doing what was essentially a 
lawyer presentation instead of a trial; whereas, as a group, 
thirteen to zero, we told the Senate at one point in time that we 
would not proceed under the rules that ultimately we did work 
under. 
 
Mr. Craig:  
 
 Multiple Choice question. Have we crossed it? We have 
crossed it. Who is responsible? The liberal media? Yes. Read 
Michael Isikoff’s book. He’s obsessed with the woman issue in 
the President’s life long before he was president of the United 
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States. The vast right wing conspiracy? Yes. That is the way 
that they attack a vulnerable president. The Office of Inde-
pendent Counsel? Yes. They used extreme investigatory tech-
niques, as if they were investigating serial killers or members 
of the mob, to investigate allegations involving an extra-
marital affair. So in my view, very strongly I believe that the 
politics of personal destruction began in 1993-94 when the in-
vestigation of the President began and investigators began 
combing the hills of Arkansas for women who would talk about 
their activities with the President. It caught on with other peo-
ple and other individuals. Larry Flint is not to be defended at 
all, but he’s not a creature of the White House or the White 
House politics. 
I think it’s a terrible thing to have happen. It’ll keep great 
people out of public service in this country. If we disqualified 
everybody who’d had some kind of difficulty in their past, we’d 
lose half the great Americans in our history. I think this is a 
terrible consequence that we’ve go to move beyond. Actually, I 
don’t see any evidence that we’re moving beyond that since the 
impeachment trial. It’s gotten just as bad. It continues to get 
worse. The real question is going to be, “What’s going to hap-
pen in the year 2000 in the presidential election?” Are we as a 
people going to rise above it and insist that candidates will not 
engage in this kind of activity or allegation, and that the media 
must do the same thing? Or are we going to continue to be in-
terested in it, pay for it, tune in on it, and listen to it the way 
we have wall-to-wall throughout the last two years. 
 
Senator Bennett:  
 
 I agree with what’s been said, but there’s, I’m sorry, some-
thing missing. In your multiple choice you did not put down—I 
will personalize it—James Carville. I had the experience of 
someone coming up to me, and he said, “I went to law school 
with Ken Starr.” He said, “Ken Starr is the most moral, up-
right, fair, intelligent—pick whatever other laudatory adjective 
that you can think of—that we’ve ever met.” He said, “All of us 
in law school decided that Ken Starr would someday either be 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or President of the United 
States, or maybe like William Howard Taft.” 
I will agree that the tactics of some of the career prosecu-
tors in Ken Starr’s office crossed a line that I would not want to 
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see crossed. I would not want to be hounded, attacked and vili-
fied as some of them did. The thing that disturbs me the most 
about all of this is that I no longer have any confidence in the 
Justice Department of the United States, with respect to mal-
feasance on the part of a member of the Clinton Administra-
tion. I come back now to my comment which I made in my 
speech that the founding fathers expected that I would not 
“check at the door” my understanding of what went on in this 
administration. 
I have been in all three investigative panels that have oc-
curred in the Clinton Presidency: Whitewater I, headed by 
Donald Regal; Whitewater II, headed by Al D’Amato; and 
Campaign Finance, headed by Fred Thompson. I don’t know 
why I got to be lucky Pierre, but I was on all three committees. 
I have seen members of this administration lie repeatedly, con-
vincingly, and continually in every one of those. The first one, 
under Don Regal, we had a member of the administration say 
he lied to his diary. We quoted his diary as a contemporary 
event of what happened and he said, “No, I wasn’t being accu-
rate when I was recording the day’s events. That’s not really 
what happened. You have to believe the President’s version.” 
In Whitewater II, I had the experience of sitting there while 
we played a tape recording of a conversation to a witness and 
had her say “I don’t know that that’s my voice.” I said, “I can 
assure you, ma’am that’s your voice.” This, to me, is the most 
distressing consequence that brought us to where we are. I 
agree that we should not worry about what George W. Bush did 
while he was in college or before he got married. I don’t think 
that has anything to do with his qualifications to be president, 
but I assure you we’re going to hear every word of that in this 
upcoming election, because I hear my Democratic friends 
sharpening their knives. You talk about combing the hills of 
Arkansas, they’re combing the hills of Texas and saying, “We’re 
going to find every woman he dated prior to his marriage and 
we’re going to proceed with this.” That, I agree, is toxic in 
American politics and should be put behind us. 
But if we’re going to get the list of who’s responsible, yeah, 
the media’s responsible. And yeah, there is a vast right-wing 
conspiracy. It’s terribly inept, and I don’t know how vast it is. 
Getting close to my military language, some people would say 
that it is half-vast. I think future historians will look back on 
this administration and say that the war-room mentality of the 
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Clintons that they brought with them from their political cul-
ture in Arkansas contributed mightily to the mess we find our-
selves in. 





 My question has to do with precedent in terms of what a 
high crime used to be. It seems to me that the Senate’s im-
peachment and removal of Judge Nixon established the prece-
dent that perjury is an impeachable offense. Has the Clinton 






 I don’t think you can read precedent into an acquittal. 
That’s part of the vagaries of the Senate impeachment proceed-
ing. I mean, you really can’t tell why the Senate did what it did 
when it voted to acquit. When you vote to convict, you know 
what it did. So precedential value, I’m not certain what it has. I 
think there is an argument, I’m certain I agree with it, that 
judges ought to be considered differently than presidents in 
impeachment. It is not an argument that comes from the text of 
the Constitution. It’s an argument that perhaps comes from 
some of the structure, but no express language. The argument 
is that an unelected—judges are obviously appointed for life 
during good behavior—that we are so distrustful of giving that 
sort of power to unelected officials that the Senate, the only 
control that we have over judges is the impeachment process. 
So therefore, we will be a little more demanding of judges than 
we would of an elected official who, in the case of the president, 
is term limited to two terms and stands for election after his 
first term, where the people have an ability to come in and put 
a check on him. That is the argument. Mr. Craig might be able 
to expand on it. 
That’s the argument. I’ll let you decide which is most true. 
It is an argument that has some resonance with the Senate. 
When you go through the impeachment convictions of the Sen-
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ate, and they’ve all been of judges, they rely an awful lot on the 
good behavior language of the Constitution that the judges 
serve for life during good behavior. It’s a matter of historical 
exegesis. It is a little bit difficult to know how much the Good 
Behavior Clause meant to prior sentence. 
 
Mr. Craig:  
 
 I’ll just make two quick comments. One is the function of 
judges is different; the terms of judges are different. There’s 
nothing in the Constitution’s text that says that the standard 
should be different for judges as opposed to presidents, but in 
fact the way in which presidents have been treated throughout 
our history is different from the way we’ve treated judges. 
We’ve had many judges that have been impeached and not one 
president has been removed from office. 
The second thing I’d say is fifty-five senators voted to acquit 
the President on Article I having to do with perjury. I don’t 
know how to interpret that vote of fifty-five. Whether fifty-five 
believed there was insufficient evidence to establish a case that 
[the President] perjured himself in front of the grand jury or 
whether they found that there was a case of perjury but they 
didn’t think it was a high crime or misdemeanor or they went 
down the Byrd logic and said, “Yes, he did it. Yes, it was a 
crime. Yes, it was a high crime, but no, we shouldn’t remove 
him.” I agree with Tom [Griffith] in that the vote to acquit on 
the perjury count you can’t really parse it successfully and use 
it to establish a precedent for the future. In my own view, a 
president of the United States, elected for a four-year term by 
the only political action that all the people of the country do to-
gether, is different from a judge who has a life-term and who 
terms during good behavior. 
 
Congressman Cannon:  
 
 I think this is the most interesting historical art of the trial 
myself because it’s a new argument that came up partly be-
cause we haven’t had other impeachments other than Nixon 
resigning, so we never got to this issue in modern times. Per-
sonally, as I read the Constitution, it seems to me that the im-
peachment process is unified, and I think that’s consistent with 
history, but I think we’re in a changed time and we’ve had a 
LEE-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:30 AM 
1079] IMPEACHMENT PANEL TRANSCRIPT 1129 
change. Historically, you’ll recall that when we were selling the 
Constitution to the states there were a lot of discussions. 
One of the things that the states really hated was a power-
ful president. On the other hand, the founding fathers went 
through a debate and came up with a position and a context for 
the presidency. When the Constitution was sold to the states, it 
was sold on the issue of a president that is subject to impeach-
ment. When they said that, they meant the same standards as 
a judge. The reason they thought that is since you’re vesting so 
much authority and power in one man, the ability to remove 
him should be at least as easy as it is to remove a judge who 
would otherwise serve for life. 
On the other hand, we are now in a big transition in society. 
This is a debate I don’t think would have been had forty or fifty 
years ago. It became part of the debate, and part of the reason 
for that is because we now have a term limit of two terms. I 
think the back side of that debate is one that we need to be 
thinking about as Americans, because today a president of the 
United States can do more by 9:15 with e-mail than George 
Washington could do in six weeks. The world is a different 
place, and the ability to exercise power is much greater. I’ve 
said in a way of hoping and by suggestion that this President in 
his final two years could still leave the greatest legislative leg-
acy in modern history. Why? Because we have some serious 
and very clear legislative initiatives where if he took the initia-
tive we could come to consensus in America and move forward. 
John Breaux’s committee did not come to consensus on what 
ought to happen to Medicare, but if the President stepped for-
ward and said we need competition, we would solve that prob-
lem, and that would be a great solution, a great problem that 
we’re relieved of. 
We now have to say to ourselves, if a president can serve for 
eight years given the enormous power of the incumbency, do we 
follow the logic that this is not a lifetime appointment, and 
therefore he should be held to a higher standard for impeach-
ment, or do we say because he has all that power and that 
power increases as our ability to communicate increases and 
therefore we should impeach him at even a lower standard 
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Senator Bennett:  
 
 One of the issues that we heard over and over again was 
exactly what has been articulated. The president is elected and 
therefore he is different. I think it’s safe to say of all the 
speeches that were made during our deliberation period on the 
Democratic side, the constant theme was “Do not overturn a 
popular election.” We were told, “This is the only popularly-
elected president in history.” They find a fine distinction be-
tween Andrew Johnson, who was elected vice president, so 
they’re saying, “this was the only popularly-elected president in 
history and DO NOT overturn an election.” 
We heard lectures about the sanctity of the vote and so on. 
The Senate voted as it voted, but the Senate has a clear history 
of overturning popular elections with its power when they feel 
there is sufficient violation of the public trust. The most recent 
example being Bob Packwood. He was popularly elected. He re-
signed because the votes were clearly there overwhelmingly to 
remove him, to evict him. The House of Representatives evicted 
Adam Clayton Powell after he had won an election. He went 
back to his district, won the election to fill the vacancy created 
by his expulsion and came back to the House, where upon the 
House said, we will not expel you a second time, but we will 
deny you your Committee chairmanship, your seniority and 
everything else that is within the power of the House to give 
you. The people have elected a criminal whom we have ex-
pelled, and the people have the right to do that, but we have 
the right to withhold the emoluments of office, whereupon he 
went down to [] and pretty much drank himself to death and 
ended an otherwise promising career. So, I think the Senate 
has the right to say, we will overturn the election if the evi-






 Thanks for the lists, Mr. Craig. My question is in number 
two. You mentioned the significance of the articles of censure. 
I’ve been curious ever since those were brought up about their 
basis within the Constitution. I wonder if you could articulate 
that for us. 
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Answer 
 
Mr. Craig:  
  
 They seemed to be highly debated in the House, and I didn’t 
understand why it was highly debated in the House, because 
there were those who argued and I think actually one of the 
congressmen from Connecticut, Chris Shays, who actually 
voted not to impeach the President, was most intensely op-
posed to the idea of passing a resolution of censure because 
there’s no provision in the Constitution that seems to apply to 
it. 
There was the concern that it might be viewed as a viola-
tion of the prohibition against the articles of attainders that 
specify punishment for a specific individual. Under the rules of 
both the House and the Senate, both bodies, whether acting 
alone or together through joint resolutions or concurrent reso-
lutions or Senate resolutions or House resolutions, can express 
their views on any subject, whether it’s the fitness of Joe 
McCarthy to carry out his duties as the chairman or the sena-
tor from Wisconsin, or whether it’s to wish Harry Truman a 
happy birthday after he’s retired. There is nothing to prevent 
the House or the Senate, working together or acting alone, 
from formally expressing its views as to the President’s con-
duct. That was what we thought a resolution of censure meant. 
In fact, as I understand it, three or four members of the 
House Democratic Judiciary Committee had drafted a very, 
very tough resolution of censure that was used heavily against 
the President in favor of his removal on the floor of the Senate. 
It seems to me that if there was a public rebuke that was re-
quired, given our view of the evidence and our view of the Con-
stitution, the public rebuke that was most appropriate was 
something along these lines—a statement of condemnation—
and a moral rebuke of the President. It could have been negoti-
ated if there was anything that was going to be requested of 
the President in terms of his action. If he had to pay a fine, 
that could have been discussed. If he had to sign it, that could 
have been also negotiated. As it was, the proposed resolution of 
censure that was offered in the House and voted on in the Judi-
ciary Committee and rejected by a party-line vote and the pro-
posed resolution of censure that Senator Bennett and Senator 
Feinstein had worked on relentlessly, and I think with good in-
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tentions, didn’t have an opportunity in either the Senate or the 
House to find a vote and give the members of both bodies an 
opportunity to express their views on this. 
I think that was the appropriate way of resolving this. I 
still do not believe that the conduct, as blameworthy and wrong 
and as disappointing as I’ve gone all through that and the 
President himself has acknowledged his misconduct and apolo-
gized for it and asked for forgiveness for it. He has acknowl-
edged that some kind of formal condemnation or rebuke would 
be appropriate. He’s not ever fought that. But there was never 
an opportunity to carry that to pass, and I regret that. I think 
it was a failure of leadership, not attributable to any individ-
ual, but a failure of leadership of the Republican majority in 
the House. 
I think what happened was that Speaker Gingrich left, 
Speaker-elect Livingston hadn’t arrived. There was no decision-
making at a leadership level among the Republican majority in 
the House and so it was left to Hyde, and Gingrich and Living-
ston themselves to orchestrate a decision on this. I think that 
was a bad decision for the nation that brought us to a situation 
where the President was impeached on a party-line vote and 
essentially acquitted on a party-line vote where not one Demo-
cratic senator, if this case were so close why was it that not one 
Democratic senator voted to convict? 
 
Senator Bennett:  
 






 Senator, how do you feel about the censure issue? Do you 




Senator Bennett:  
 
 Well, on a constitutional basis I agree. I think it’s within 
the powers of the Senate and the House, and if I had been in 
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the House—and Chris [Cannon] and I would probably have had 
words on this—I would have voted to allow a censure motion in 
the House. I disagree that any such motion could carry with it 
any kind of penalty. If there had been a fine connected with it, 
in my opinion that’s a bill of attainder, and so I would have 
fought the purely political cover kind of censure motion that 
was coming in. I kept saying to my colleagues when I was 
working on censure in the Senate, do not misunderstand. In my 
view, this is not an alternative to voting on conviction. 
We have a constitutional duty to hold this trial and to bring 
it to closure, as Chris has said, one way or the other. We have 
to have a vote up or down, and I will not support any kind of ef-
fort to give us an alternative to that vote. If that vote is not suf-
ficient to remove the President, my motivation is that I do not 
want history to look back on this and say, “This was Andrew 
Johnson. This was a purely partisan situation, and therefore it 
can be ignored.” While nobody pays any attention to me, I take 
opportunities like this to point out this fact. There were fifty 
votes to remove the President. There were thirty-three co-
sponsors on the censure motion that Senator Feinstein and I 
crafted of those who did not vote to remove the President. If 
you add those who were willing to condemn his behavior in 
very strong terms to those who thought that behavior rose to 
the level of removal, you have formally on the record eighty-
three senators who, one way or the other, have said that this 
President’s activities have been despicable. That’s what I hope 
my grandchildren get taught when they read the history of this 
case. That’s what I was interested in establishing as a histori-
cal record, after the fact, with respect to what this was all 
about. 
 
Mr. Griffith:  
 
 One of the things that was most surprising to me in work-
ing with Democratic senators during the impeachment proceed-
ing was to find out how badly they wanted a censure motion. It 
was very genuine. Some people would say that’s for political 
cover, but I think it was a lot more than that. It was genuine 
outrage at the President’s conduct and a real desire to go on re-
cord to condemn it. I think we understand the political reasons 
why that didn’t happen. I think we just ran out of time. I think 
if February 12 was the drop-dead deadline and everyone would 
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be over it by then. 
 
Senator Bennett:  
 
 No, there were several factors. Number one, once the vote 
was over, everybody was sick of this and they wanted it over. I 
was besieged with reporters, and I said, “It’s over. Go home. 




 And here we are! 
 
Senator Bennett:  
 
 That was the only time I’ve been picked up in Time maga-
zine and they listed it with the week’s top quotes. Bob Bennett, 
and the identifying line strip said, “The President’s lawyer.” 
My fifteen minutes of fame was stolen from me. There were 
several factors. That was the overwhelming one. People wanted 
it over. There were senators, led by Phil Gramm of Texas, who 
earnestly and fervently believed that this was unconstitutional, 
and Phil used all of his abilities and rights as a senator to block 
it ever coming to a vote. As long as he had forty votes, which he 
did, that would guarantee that it would never come to a vote. I 
kept telling Diane, “Look, this is inevitable. Let’s not try to 
fight Phil on this. Let’s just gather as many cosponsors as we 
can, so that it’s a matter of historical record with the cospon-
sors,” and we filed it with those cosponsors on it. The other fac-
tor there, and I must be honest about it, as it became clear that 
the White House was going to win the trial, Democratic sena-
tors who had previously been very enthusiastic about our ef-
forts for a meaningful censure resolution suddenly began to 
find reasons to drop off. The White House no longer felt they 
needed this for political cover, and those senators who were re-
sponsive to the White House on political reasons then disap-
peared. Many of the original people who had told me absolutely 
they would cosponsor and fight for the resolution were not 
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Congressman Cannon:  
 
 Let me just say that it’s possible to have a negotiated 
agreement and censure for the president where you have 
what’s essentially a bill of attainder. I only believe that would 
have been a very bad precedent for American history. So that’s 
where we had a slight disagreement as to that. Senator Ben-
nett and I, of course, may have argued over the appropriate-
ness of impeachment versus censure, but what he has said is 
correct. We could have censured the President. My argument 
was that impeachment was more appropriate. 
Let me just add one personal note. You have some institu-
tional imperatives here. The House of Representatives is often 
called the “People’s House” and we do things differently then 
they do them in the Senate. I would hope that anything that 
I’ve said here would not be construed here as being personally 
offensive because Senator Bennett is one of my good friends. 
He’s a man of integrity and honor. While I have had the occa-
sion to laugh a little bit about how the Senate and its outcomes, 
I don’t mean that to be personal, by any means, to Senator 
Bennett or any one else. It ought to be a matter of great in-







 This question is for you, Mr. Craig. I think that the chief 
concern for the average American is whether or not we can 
trust this man. Having represented the President and at the 
same time acknowledging the wrong things that he has done, 
please share with us your feelings of whether or not you can sit 
before us or any body of American people and say that you will 
personally be able to trust everything that comes out of our 
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Answer 
 
Mr Craig:  
 
 Well, you know, that’s a fair question. I saw President Clin-
ton in the six months that I was in the White House, and I’d 
never been in the White House before serving a president. But 
in the six months that I was there, I worked very closely with 
him, and I think I saw him at his very best, and I must say, I 
think I saw him on occasion at his worst. 
One of the reasons he did prevail—and Senator Bennett, I’d 
be interested in your reaction to this—is that if you go back 
and look at the calendar of events that was going along in Sep-
tember, October, November, December, as the impeachment 
calendar was going on. Every now and then they joined, and 
suddenly we found the day we were going to have a vote on the 
floor of the House, we were bombing Iraq. We got there sort of 
independently. But if you look at the days leading up to the 
bombing, we did that totally independently. That date had 
been set many, many weeks before, and people had been 
briefed about it, and Saddam Hussein had been given that date 
as a fate of compliance with UNSCOM’s access, and if he didn’t 
comply by then, he was going to be hit. It was quite clear and 
when that deadline was set, we did not know that the House of 
Representatives was going to vote on impeachment that day. 
In fact, when that was explained to the members of the 
Senate and the House, I think people accepted it. The point I’m 
trying to make is a different point, and that is, if you look at 
President Clinton’s performance as president between Septem-
ber 15 and December 15, which is about hundred days, it’s ab-
solutely extraordinary. On the international basis, it begins 
with a speech to the General Assembly, which received a stand-
ing ovation. Now, I assure you that that standing ovation at 
the General Assembly was not for the United States of Amer-
ica, that doesn’t happen at the General Assembly. It was for 
Bill Clinton’s leadership in the international world. 
It was followed by meetings with Vaclav Havel. In public, 
Vaclav Havel painfully spoke English to express his view of 
President Clinton’s moral leadership on these issues interna-
tionally. Nelson Mandela was receiving an award on the Hill, 
and he spoke. He took occasion to speak about President Clin-
ton. The [] negotiations, which were very, very difficult, and 
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would not have been completed successfully. The second stage 
of the peace process was completed successfully only because of 
President Clinton’s personal participation. 
King Hussein came from his hospital bed to make that 
statement. So we had three of the great moral leaders of the 
world talking about President Clinton’s capacity to lead the 
world morally. 
Then you had domestically the showdown between the Con-
gress and the continuing resolution, and Senator Bennett can 
speak with much greater authority than I can, but the Presi-
dent stuck up for his agenda, declined to agree to the continu-
ing resolution priorities, and in the face-off with the Republican 
leadership in the Senate and the House, he emerged victorious 
domestically as President of the Unites States qua President, 
with his agenda very much intact going into an election as a 
very, very strong domestic political leader, winning essentially 
the election in such a fashion as never has been seen in the 
second term of a sitting president in an off-year election, pick-
ing up five seats in the House, holding his own in the Senate. 
So, all I’m saying is that in the hundred days of this period 
of time when he was at his lowest—and I can tell you it was 
very low—Kent Conrad told me when I first talked with him 
two or three days after I got there that we were about forty-
eight hours away from receiving a delegation of Senate Democ-
rats asking for his resignation. It was very, very low. The 
President performed as president magnificently. The historians 
will go back and notice that. I think that contributed ultimately 
to the success of his trial, in his own defense. 
I think that his capacity to work with the House and the 
Senate has been damaged. I don’t doubt that one bit. It had al-
ready been damaged before the impeachment process had be-
gun because of something I’ve told Tom [Griffith]. As I arrived 
in the White House and started working with the members of 
the House Judiciary Committee and the Democrats in the Con-
gress, I realized that there was no great love for the Presi-
dent—personal love, loyalty or affection for him. They were not 
defending him because they liked him or they agreed with him 
or that they admired him. They were defending him for other 
reasons. I think this was also true in the Senate. Senator Ben-
nett can confirm that. This was not a labor of love for the De-
mocrats. There was something else going on here. So, yeah, I 
think that his capacity to work with the House and the Senate 
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has been damaged, but his abilities, his political abilities, are 
really extraordinary. His capacity to identify objectives and use 
the energy and the leadership of the White House to achieve 
those objectives is quite extraordinary. That’s where I agree 
with the Congressman that there is still the potential in this 
administration to have some significant legislative achieve-
ments with the Congress that almost impeached him and al-
most removed him from office. So, it’s a fair question to ask. 
You know, I think one of the things you don’t want to do is 
to carry on inquisitions into people’s personal lives and ask 
questions that are embarrassing to families, embarrassing to 
spouses, embarrassing to people who work. That is the politics 
of personal destruction, and I would hope we can move beyond 
that. 
